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ABSTRACT 
The threats facing America today are different from the threats on 9/11. The 
actions the United States took to defend against similar attacks were necessary; however, 
the increase in attacks by non-foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) requires agencies to 
evolve. This thesis explores how the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can 
be leveraged to enhance the intelligence capabilities of the U.S. government. This thesis 
begins by identifying the threats facing America in 2021. Through a review of legislation, 
government sources, and scholarly work, this thesis presents the debate amongst sources 
on the threats America is facing and the role the U.S. government is taking to defeat the 
threats. This thesis lays out the TSA’s current intelligence structure and the legislation 
in which the TSA operates against today’s threats. Finally, this thesis provides the 
existing legal framework that allows the TSA to enhance its intelligence activity for 
U.S. national security. The findings reveal FTOs are no longer the number one threat. 
The research shows an increase in different threats to America, such as 
domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime, and espionage within the 
homeland. To confront these threats, the TSA must evolve to defend the U.S. 
transportation sector by enhancing its intelligence activity with the U.S. 
government. Further, this thesis shows current legislation provides a roadmap for 
the TSA to participate in additional intelligence activities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC) and law enforcement (LE) agencies were re-structured to respond to the 
types of attacks encountered at that time. The changes occurred from a reactionary posture 
and were deemed necessary to ensure the safety of America moving forward.1 However, 
the last 20 years has seen an increase in domestic terrorism, transnational organized 
criminal (TOC) activity, and espionage from bad actors resident in the homeland. This 
increase in activity has caused the U.S. IC and LE agencies to plan, budget, and reorganize 
their organizations to tackle these threats more effectively.  
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), refinement has resulted in 
multiple systems collecting vast amounts of information and analyzing the data, in part, for 
vetting and watchlisting purposes. This refinement also included the creation of the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The TSA is ideally positioned to access 
valuable data, which can be of further use in the U.S. fight to counter threats to the 
homeland. This thesis argues that the TSA needs to enhance information sharing with U.S. 
government organizations through enhanced intelligence capabilities. The opportunity cost 
in failing to improve the TSA’s intelligence collection is an overall loss of intelligence that 
can be usefully applied by multiple U.S. IC and LE agencies against the diverse threats 
America is currently facing. 
To demonstrate the need for modernizing the TSA’s intelligence functions, this 
thesis explores the unclassified literature on the threats facing America today and the IC’s 
responsibilities since 9/11, as well as the TSA’s support to intelligence. The TSA was 
created to secure the nation’s public transportation sector, albeit with a focus on the 
screening of airline passengers. Almost two decades later, some still espouse overseas 
terrorism as the number one threat, such as former National Security Advisor John R. 
1 Robert S. Mueller, III, “The FBI Transformation since 2001,” 1, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
September 14, 2006, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbi-transformation-since-2001. 
xiv 
Bolton (2018–2019) who proclaims “radical Islamist militants” are the highest threat facing 
America today.2 
On the flip side, the research shows that the United States is no longer concerned 
with solely countering threats from overseas terrorist organizations akin to al-Qaeda and 
ISIS. In fact, Michael C. McGarrity, former Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Counterterrorism Division (2018–2019), noted, “there have been more 
arrests and deaths caused by domestic terrorists than international terrorists in recent 
years.”3 Further, the 2019 United States National Intelligence Strategy puts a significant 
precedence on traditional state actors, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.  
While overseas terrorism, domestic terrorism, and traditional threat actors are high 
priority targets for the U.S. government, the threat from TOCs poses just as much risk. A 
recent report by RAND presents the emergent threat of TOC actors as a “hybrid” that 
“combines aspects of criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and insurgencies,” and 
believes TOCs “pose crosscutting threats to U.S. security interest.”4 Over the last seven 
years, according to the TSA’s Insider Threat Roadmap, the TSA has encountered several 
incidents involving TOC actors, such as a 2018 event that busted several airline workers 
for smuggling illegal drugs, for a TOC group, onto departing aircraft.5  
Along with the TOC and insider threat, the TSA is concerned that “terrorists could 
exploit the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the transnational criminal 
2 Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt, “Terrorist Threat ‘More Fluid and Complex than Ever,’ White 
House Says,” New York Times, sec. 1, United States, October 4, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/us/politics/trump-counterterrorism-strategy.html. 
3 Michael C. McGarrity and Calvin A. Shivers, “Confronting White Supremacy, Statement before the 
House Oversight and Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Washington, 
D.C.,” 1, Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 4, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-
white-supremacy.
4 Angel Rabasa et al., Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal 
Networks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), XVI, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1481/RAND_RR1481.pdf. 
5 David P. Pekoske, Insider Threat Roadmap 2020 (Washington, DC: Transportation Security 
Administration, 2020), 6, 
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/3597_layout_insider_threat_roadmap_0424.pdf. 
xv 
organizations” to recruit credentialed TSA insiders.6 Defeating these shifting threats 
requires the TSA to transform just as the IC and the members within the IC have changed 
to confront the existing threats to the United States.7 
For the TSA to support the IC’s efforts, by enhancing the TSA’s intelligence 
functions, fundamental changes need to be made within the organization. The TSA is aware 
change should occur.8 However, current scholarship reveals that opinions are varied on the 
how the TSA should be employed. Former U.S. Representative John Mica (R-Fla) (1993–
2017) stated that he would like to see the TSA hand over the screening business to private 
security companies and focus “on intelligence to identify and address threats.”9 Other 
research believes the TSA has gone too far in its intelligence activity to include the DHS 
Office of Inspector General findings on the Federal Air Marshal Service Quiet Skies 
program stating the “TSA did not properly plan, implement, and manage the Quiet Skies 
program to meet the program’s mission of mitigating the threat to commercial aviation 
posed by higher risk passengers.”10 In light of the research, the TSA can transform itself, 
as some members of the IC have done, so that the TSA can better position itself for the 
future and provide enhanced intelligence capabilities to the U.S. government. 
While the TSA is not a statutory member of the IC, the TSA is a member of the 
DHS intelligence enterprise (IE), and as such, supports the U.S. intelligence activities. This 
thesis found that the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis’s (DHS I&A) statutory IC 
membership provided a pathway for the TSA to provide enhanced intelligence collection 
 
6 Pekoske, 6.  
7 James Burch, “The Domestic Intelligence Gap: Progress since 9/11?,” Homeland Security Affairs 
XVII, 1, April 1, 2008, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/129.  
8 Patricia F. S. Cogswell, “Protecting the Nation’s Transportation Systems: Oversight of the 
Transportation Security Administration,” Transportation Security Administration, 1, September 11, 2019, 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/testimony/2019/09/11/protecting-nations-transportation-systems-oversight-
transportation. 
9 Andrew Becker, “Lawmaker Says TSA Should Focus on Intelligence, Get out of Screening,” 
National Security, Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting, para. 1, April 28, 2016, 
https://www.revealnews.org/blog/lawmaker-says-tsa-should-focus-on-intelligence-get-out-of-screening/. 
10 Joseph V. Cuffari, TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program (REDACTED) 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, 2020), 2, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-11-Nov20-Redacted.pdf. 
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to contribute to improved IC analysis of potential threats to the United States’ national 
security. Just as the DHS was established to be “a concerted national effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur,” the TSA was established to 
act as a deterrent to future attacks through its operational and analytic activities.11 The 
research identified the TSA’s current intelligence structure and legal authorities in which 
it could operate. This thesis has laid out the legal framework to support any future 
intelligence enhancements. 
Indeed, the existing laws and directives already address the issue of whether the 
U.S. government, specifically the IC, can legally support expanding the TSA’s intelligence 
functions to answer national intelligence priority requirements.12 These laws include the 
National Security Act of 1947 that clearly defines the components of the IC that include 
the DHS I&A. The DHS I&A oversees the DHS IE, of which the TSA is a member. 
Additionally, this thesis identified that Executive Order 12333 stipulated that to acquire 
insight on any threats toward the United States, the intelligence needed to be of the highest 
quality and been obtained through appropriate and legal means. The responsibility to 
analyze and disseminate intelligence falls on each department and agency within the IC.13 
Further stating that in coordination with relevant organizational leaders, the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) can seek the support of non-IC organizations to engage in the 
collection and analysis of intelligence pertinent to national security.14  
This thesis found that the TSA was required to provide the DNI with the highest 
quality intelligence. Further, the research found that the Intelligence Community 
Directive—900 and Intelligence Community Directive—204 laid out the responsibility of 
 
11 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), 
2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf. 
12 These authorities are derived from the TSA’s current position within the DHS, as discussed in 
Chapter III, the Congressional mandates that established the TSA, and existing laws and directives in place 
that guide the IC’s common framework. 
13 Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” National Archives, 
12, Part 3, General Provisions, December 4, 1981, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html. 
14 Reagan. 
xvii 
the National Intelligence Manager of Aviation (NIM-A) to provide the DNI with all 
intelligence related to aviation. The NIM-A was also required to advise the DNI on the 
creation of national intelligence priorities, to include intelligence needs and intelligence 
gaps, as well as ad-hoc priorities for emergent intelligence needs, respectively.15 The 
research found that these authorities allowed the TSA to participate in additional 
intelligence activities usually associated with statutory IC members. Through the NIM-A, 
the TSA could begin to establish national intelligence priorities that not only answered 
intelligence gaps in the U.S. transportation sector but also supported the larger IC 
requirements. 
This research suggests that today’s threats are more encompassing than foreign 
terrorist organizations, and that the TSA must evolve to respond to the emerging threats on 
the aviation ecosystem and the entire U.S. transportation sector. Further, this thesis found 
that the TSA was already providing occasional valuable intelligence to the IC and LE 
communities. The TSA nevertheless can provide more value to the IC through advanced 
intelligence collection, dissemination of raw intelligence, as well as preparing strategic 
analytic products. Finally, this thesis found that existing legislation would allow the TSA 
to participate legally in additional intelligence gathering activities in support of the U.S. 
IC.  
The first recommendation is for the IC to develop specific transportation 
intelligence requirements that are unique to the TSA. With the creation and inclusion of 
transportation intelligence requirements, the TSA can then provide a definitive roadmap 
for intelligence activities.16 The second recommendation is to establish a collection 
management program at the TSA. Collection management is used to interpret intelligence 
requirements into tactical or strategic operational objectives and directs those collecting 
 
15 Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 900—Integrated Mission 
Management (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2013), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-related-menus/ic-related-links/intelligence-community-
directives. 
16 Todd Rosenblum, “Homeland Intelligence: The Unique Community within the Community,” The 
Cipher Brief (blog), 1, October 9, 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/homeland-
intelligence-the-unique-community-within-the-community. 
xviii 
information and those analyzing the collected information.17 The third recommendation is 
to modernize the TSA’s intelligence functions. No organization can function at the highest 
level or provide a superior product if it is not continually improved. Finally, the fourth 
recommendation is to develop a TSA overt strategic debriefing program. Such a program 
would be responsible for developing and executing overt Human Intelligence collection 
operations. These operations would include intelligence debriefings of overt sources, 
drafting raw intelligence reports, responding to customer requests for intelligence and 
collection management requirements, as well as maintaining detailed operational records. 
  
 
17 George J. Franz, “Beyond Desert Storm—Conducting Intelligence Collection Management 
Operations in the Heavy Division” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, School of Advance Military 
Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 8–13, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a309837.pdf. 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
“So that’s it,” John E. McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) remembered thinking when the last airplane struck its target on 
September 11, 2001.1 It was a moment in American history when the veil of homeland 
protection fell like a gauntlet. Foreign terrorists wielding box cutters and an understanding 
of some U.S. security gaps attacked the United States through the public transportation 
sector. By the end of that same day, Mr. McLaughlin stated what most Americans already 
felt, “nothing will ever be the same.”2  
So much of that statement is true for those who remember the 2001 attacks. From 
that point, and to defend from any further hostile activity on the homeland, the United 
States took aggressive military, investigative, and legislative actions to protect the security 
of its borders.3 Included in those actions, the U.S. Congress created the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and charged it with “security in all modes of 
transportation,” a rather challenging task.4  
Since its inception, the TSA has supported the mission to secure the public 
transportation infrastructure, albeit with most efforts concentrated on the aviation 
ecosystem.5 The TSA’s perspective has been focused on security and ensuring that 
terrorists are unable to highjack another commercial airliner to cause further damage on 
 
1 Dina Temple-Raston, “The State of Intelligence: Fifteen Years after 9/11,” 1, Council on Foreign 
Relations, September 12, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/event/state-intelligence-fifteen-years-after-911. 
2 Temple-Raston. 
3 History.com Editors, “Reaction to 9/11,” History, August 7, 2019, 
https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/reaction-to-9-11. 
4 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, U.S. Code 51 (2001): 1 § 101, 115 et seq., 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-bill/1447. 
5 The term “aviation ecosystem” refines the term “aviation domain” and is intended to include all 
aspects of airports, airlines, aircraft, airlift, actors, and aviation management. This term is a more holistic, 
robust description of the reality of modern aviation and more fully captures the global scope and 
complexity of the industry and the economic impact it generates. The term underscores the vast, 
interconnected systems that comprise domestic and international aviation, including civil (both commercial 
and general) and public aviation. Donald J. Trump, National Strategy for Aviation Security of the United 
States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 17–18, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=821736. 
2 
U.S. soil. However, in the last 20 years, “a complex threat landscape with enemies and 
adversaries who are constantly evolving,” has emerged as a threat against the nation.6 
These adversaries include overseas terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda (AQ) and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), U.S.-based far-right hate groups like the Proud Boys, 
and Transnational Organized Criminals. These groups and organizations have attempted to 
disrupt, penetrate, or use the transportation sector for nefarious purposes. As an example, 
in 2018, a group of U.S. aviation workers were arrested after being caught using their TSA 
credentials to access and bypass airport security measures. This group was thus able to 
smuggle drugs onto departing passenger aircraft.7 As such, the United States and the legal, 
investigative, and intelligence systems in place to defeat threats against the nation should 
continue to evolve as well. 
Indeed, the new rising concerns go beyond countering terrorism threats that mimic 
the atrocities of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack (9/11). To remain consistent with 
the DHS guiding principles to “remain resolute against today’s threats and hazards by 
keeping pace with our adversaries,” it will be valuable to incorporate the TSA’s existing 
domestic and international footprint to develop its capabilities further as an intelligence 
provider.8 Such an investment will expand the U.S. government’s counterterrorism 
knowledge base and better protect American citizens.  
A. THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 
In the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) summarizes the hostile environment the United States faces 
as progressively more intricate and ambiguous in which threats are increasingly varied and 
 
6 Kevin K. McAleenan, The DHS Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2020–2024 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2019), I, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/department-homeland-
securitys-strategic-plan-fiscal-years-2020-2024. 
7 David P. Pekoske, Insider Threat Roadmap 2020 (Washington, DC: Transportation Security 
Administration, 2020), 6, 
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/3597_layout_insider_threat_roadmap_0424.pdf. 
8 McAleenan, DHS Strategic Plan, 3.  
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interrelated.9 In addition to the internal and external terrorism threats from foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTOs), the ODNI is concerned with transnational crimes and the insider 
threat. The ODNI NIS report claims that foreign intelligence entities actively seek out ways 
to further their ideological beliefs—using cyber tools, malicious insiders, espionage, and 
supply chain exploitation—to penetrate and disrupt the interests of the United States.10 
This section reviews the priority threats to U.S. national security. 
1. Terrorism Threat from Overseas 
Since 9/11, the United States has spent large sums of money to protect its borders 
from further attacks.11 It appears that there has been a great deal of success on this front. 
No further large-scale terrorist activities have occurred within the U.S. aviation 
ecosystem.12 Much of this protection has been accomplished through the creation and 
expansion of multiple government agencies, as well as investment in traditional law 
enforcement (LE) and intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.13 The terrorism 
threats from overseas are ever present and require continued attention.  
The United States faces the threat of terrorism sponsored by nation states including, 
for example, Iran that supports militant and terrorist groups throughout the world, such as 
the Lebanese Hizballah (Hizballah).14 Through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
Qods Force, Iran provides groups like Hizballah with money, training, and operational 
 
9 Daniel R. Coats, National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 4, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-
publications/item/1943-2019-national-intelligence-strategy. 
10 Coats, 14.  
11 Neta C. Crawford, Costs of War (Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute International 
and Public Affairs, 2018), 2–6, 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Esti
mates%20Through%20FY2019%20.pdf. 
12 Erik Goepner and Trevor A. Thrall, “Time to Step Back from the War on Terror,” Cato Institute, 
October 26, 2017, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-step-back-war-terror. 
13 David Inserra, “Here’s How Safe We Are 17 Years after 9/11,” 1, The Heritage Foundation, 
September 11, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/commentary/heres-how-safe-we-are-17-
years-after-911. 
14 Nathan A. Sales, “Countering Iran’s Global Terrorism,” Department of State, November 13, 2018, 
https://www.state.gov/countering-irans-global-terrorism/. 
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direction. Due to Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, Hizballah maintains an extensive military 
and intelligence capability, stockpiles modern arms, and retains a widespread network of 
operatives and sympathizers overseas to include individuals located within the United 
States.15 These threat actors seek to interrupt American democracy through traditional 
forms of violent terrorism, as well as leveraging emerging technology including “the 
emergence of more secure modes of communications, the expansion of social and mass 
media, and persistent instability across several regions.”16  
According to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, not only is the United 
States concerned with nation state actors and groups like AQ and ISIS, it is also worried 
about revolutionary, nationalist, and separatist movements, such as the Nordic Resistance 
Movement (NRM), the neo-Nazi National Action Group (N3AG), and Babbar Khalsa 
International.17 These organizations use violence and assassinations to disrupt political 
parties, economic interests, and religious organizations. While these movements have not 
committed terrorist activities within the homeland, sans AQ, their terrorist actions place 
U.S. citizens and foreign interests at risk, especially Americans and American businesses 
operating overseas.18 Additionally, the NRM and N3AG have interacted and shared their 
anti-western views with organizations inside the United States. Each of these organizations 
is determined to impose its will against America by influencing and recruiting like-minded 
individuals to engage in terroristic behavior.  
As opposed to 2001, the planning, prepping, and executing of an attack can be 
accomplished in relative anonymity online and can be accomplished in less time across 
multiple borders. To combat these types of enemies, the United States must remain agile 
in its approach to countering these threats and be creative in the way it uses agencies to 
pursue these terrorists. 
 
15 Donald J. Trump, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 9–10, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf. 
16 Trump, 7–10. 
17 Trump, 9. 
18 Trump, 11. 
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2. The Threat from Domestic Terrorism 
While preventing threats from foreign entities remains a top priority for the U.S. 
government, domestic terrorism is also on the rise.19 Over the last six years, a significant 
spike in violent domestic terrorist activity has resulted because recruitment and 
radicalization has become quicker and easier through online forums.20 According to the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), hundreds of terrorist plans or attacks 
have occurred in the United States since 2015.21 The challenge for the U.S. IC and LE 
community is to mine the suspects of these plans and attacks showing signs of 
radicalization or terrorist affiliation.  
In December 2015, two U.S. citizens inspired by the foreign terrorist group ISIS, 
opened fire inside the training room of the San Bernardino Environmental Health Services 
Department and killed 14 people.22 Both assailants, Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen 
Malik, were able to flee the scene and continue to wreak havoc when later confronted by 
the police. They began to open gunfire on the police officers until the suspects were finally 
shot dead.23 Then, in June 2016, Omar Mateen, who also swore allegiance to ISIS, opened 
gunfire inside a Florida nightclub killing 49 people. The nightclub attack was the deadliest 
terrorist attack in America since the 2001 attacks. In both incidents, authorities at the local, 
state, and federal level were unaware of the suspects’ affiliation or plans. While these two 
incidents were conducted under the guise of religious terrorism, far-right extremists, and 
 
19 Legally classifying domestic terrorism appears to be a challenge for authorities. The difficultly in 
distinguishing between a domestic terrorist and a person committing a violent crime is based on the 
definition. Domestic terrorism in the United States is defined as “ideologically motivated acts that are 
harmful to human life and intended to intimidate civilians, influence policy, or change government 
conduct.” Trevor Aaronson, “Terrorism’s Double Standard: Violent Far-Right Extremists Are Rarely 
Prosecuted as Terrorists,” 1, The Intercept, March 23, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-
terrorism-fbi-prosecutions/.  
20 Michael C. McGarrity, “Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland,” 1, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, May 8, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-the-rise-of-
domestic-terrorism-in-the-homeland. 
21 Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington, The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the 
United States (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020), https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200612_Jones_DomesticTerrorism_v6.pdf. 
22 Jeremiah J. Hart, “Strategic Mutual Aid Response to Terrorism: A New Approach” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 25, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=839423. 
23 Hart, 26–34.  
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particularly members associated with white supremacy and militias, plan and execute most 
of the domestic terrorist attacks in the United States.24 
Over the last two years, members who affiliate with far-right organizations have 
conducted numerous attacks that have been violent, deadly, and have stoked fear into the 
hearts and minds of the American public. According to a report by the United Nations, the 
COVID-19 pandemic may have contributed to the increase in domestic terrorism in the 
United States by providing plenty of time for vulnerable people to view extremist 
propaganda online and engage with like-minded individuals. This contact has led them to 
radicalize, which in some cases, has also led them to engage in violence.25 Throughout 
2020, right-wing terrorists conducted and carried out seven high-profile terrorist acts. In 
October 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested 13 individuals who were 
preparing to kidnap the governor of Michigan because they believed that the governor’s 
policies to limit the spread of COVID-19 were illegal. All the individuals involved were 
affiliated with the Boogaloo movement.26 Domestic terrorism is directly impacting the 
TSA and how it approaches the vetting and analysis of the people affiliated with the U.S. 
transportation sector. 
The most recent and highly visible and reported domestic terrorist attack occurred 
in January 2021 during the certification of the Presidential Electoral College vote by the 
U.S. Congress. Pro-Trump supporters overran the security perimeter of the U.S. Capitol 
building and forced entry into the government facility. The panic and fear of that incident 
was broadcast worldwide, with most people in shock and fear of the potential outcome. 
 
24 Dan Glaun, “A Timeline of Domestic Extremism in the U.S., from Charlottesville to January 6,” 
Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, April 21, 2021, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-us-domestic-extremism-charlottesville-january-6/. 
25 Antonia Marie De Meo, Stop the Virus of Disinformation: The Risk of Malicious Use of Social 
Media during COVID-19 and the Technology Options to Fight It (Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2020), 7–9, http://www.unicri.it/sites/default/files/2020-
11/SM%20misuse.pdf. 
26 The Boogaloo movement, whose cohorts are often referred to as “Boogaloo Boys” or “Boogaloo 
Bois,” is a developing “anti-government extremist movement that formed in 2019. In 2020, boogaloorers 
increasingly engaged in real world activities as well as online activities, showing up at protests and rallies 
around gun rights, pandemic restrictions and police-related killings.” The term “boogaloo” is in reference 
to a future civil war. “The Boogaloo Movement,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed June 14, 2021, 
https://www.adl.org/boogaloo. 
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Sadly, five people died during that attack. According to the George Washington University 
Program on Extremism Project, 569 people and counting have been arrested and charged 
with various crimes due to their involvement with the Capitol terrorist act.27 When 
reviewing the criminal complaints and indictments on these individuals, some of the people 
charged have a nexus to the U.S. transportation sector who include truck drivers, pilots, 
and even state police forces.28 Individuals who display such derogatory action against the 
nation are a threat to the transportation system from the inside.  
Identifying individuals within the homeland who maintain or are developing violent 
ideological tendencies can be difficult. However, some of these individuals appear to have 
access to sensitive information and facilities, such as the aviation worker who is intimate 
with airport security protocols and can attack with little to no warning. To protect these 
assets, the U.S. government must continually look for ways to improve its overall 
collection and dissemination of valuable threat information. Taking advantage of the 
organizations, strategies, and policies in-place will provide greater coverage and 
identification of individuals with nefarious agendas. In a response to the ODNI’s 2021 
assessment on domestic violent extremism in the United States, President Biden’s 
administration has begun discussing ways in which agencies created to fight the 
international war on terrorism can be used to fight domestic terrorism.29 The TSA’s access 
to thousands of individuals who work in and around sensitive transportation environments, 
such as airports and cargo facilities, domestically and overseas, can be used to identify and 
report on those who seek to do harm to America.  
 
27 “Capitol Hill Siege,” GW Program on Extremism, 2021, https://extremism.gwu.edu/Capitol-Hill-
Cases. Citation is an Excel document located in the middle of the webpage. 
28 GW Program on Extremism. Citation is links associated with each identified individual. 
29 Betsy Woodruff Swan, “DHS Looking at Tracking Travel of Domestic Extremists,” POLITICO, 1, 
March 23, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/23/homeland-security-domestic-extremists-
477658; Director of National Intelligence, (U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 
2021 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-
17MAR21.pdf. 
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3. The Threat from Transnational Organized Crime 
In his July 2019 comments to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Christopher Wray, 
Director of the FBI, stressed that today’s transnational organized crime (TOC) enterprises 
represented a considerable and escalating threat to the security of the United States and its 
international partners.30 The TOC networks endanger the security of legitimate 
governments through illicit activities of “stock market fraud and manipulation, cyber-
facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, drug trafficking, identity theft, human 
trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, 
extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities.”31  
A major threat of transnational crime to national security, if left unchecked, is that 
most TOC groups wield extensive power and have deep financial pockets that can be used 
to influence state-backed economies and affect legitimate governments by corrupting 
public officials.32 This type of social transition, as an effect of transnational crime, can be 
seen in places, such as Lebanon, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, as well as West Africa 
and the Sahel.33 Within these environments, nefarious organized groups have taken over 
certain amounts of responsibility from the legitimate governments, due to the TOC 
syndicates’ willingness to employ violence and engage in bribery, coercion, and 
corruption.34 Limiting the opportunities for these threats to take hold, and defeating the 
transnational criminal actors in place, requires a robust strategy and maximizing the assets 
at the disposal of the U.S. government.  
 
30 Christopher Wray, “Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, heading Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and Opioids, July 23, 2019, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-the-federal-bureau-of-investigation-072319.  
31 Wray, para. 1. 
32 “What We Investigate: Transnational Organized Crime,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 
April 25, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime. 
33 Angel Rabasa et al., Counternetwork Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal 
Networks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1481/RAND_RR1481.pdf.  
34 National Security Staff, Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and 
International Security (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 158, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/60577. 
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The TSA is not immune from TOC networks. The U.S. transportation sector is used 
extensively in TOC activity, such as money laundering, people smuggling, weapons, and 
drug trafficking. In 2017, a former TSA security officer was sentenced to serve time in 
prison for actively supporting TOC smuggling operations for two years. As a federal 
employee within the aviation sector, the TSA officer wittingly provided sensitive 
information, on multiple occasions, to TOC members seeking to transport illegal drugs 
through U.S. airports. In this case, the TSA officer allowed TOC members to circumvent 
security screening of their baggage by informing the TOCs in which security lane the 
officer would be positioned to allow the TOCs’ baggage to pass without additional 
screening.35 This incident is not isolated. The TOC actors in this example could have easily 
been smuggling weapons or explosives that could have caused immediate and serious harm 
within an airport or onboard an airliner. 
In referring to the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, the 
ODNI made clear the priority to develop, stabilize, and incorporate instruments of 
American power to combat transnational organized crime.36 The ODNI believes this 
priority can be accomplished through additional intelligence collection and intelligence 
sharing by creating an environment of collaboration amongst U.S. authorities and foreign 
liaisons.37 
4. The Threat from Espionage 
Counterintelligence, insider threats, and whistleblowers, which typically fall under 
the espionage umbrella, carry with them significant risk to the homeland and national 
security of the United States. According to the International Spy Museum in Washington, 
 
35 “Former TSA Transportation Security Officer Sentenced to 21 Months in Prison for Circumventing 
Security Checkpoint Screening,” 1, The United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of California, 
United States Department of Justice, accessed May 24, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/former-
tsa-transportation-security-officer-sentenced-21-months-prison-circumventing. 
36 “Transnational Organized Crime,” 1, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, June 2011, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/ise/archive/additional-resources/2146-
transnational-organized-crime. 
37 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 1. 
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DC, over 10,000 spies are in the District of Columbia and the surrounding areas.38 
Traditionally, these spies, also referred to as intelligence officers, maintain a cover, such 
as diplomat, attaché or liaison, student, or simply an ordinary citizen.39 All these 
individuals pose a potential threat to national security due to their professional objectives 
to gain access to non-public information and facilities. To gain access, these spies seek out 
well-placed individuals who are vulnerable to being recruited.40 Eliminating all the 
vulnerabilities an individual presents is not possible. However, it is possible to identify and 
mitigate threats through advanced warning and reporting. 
To be sure, one of the risks, under the espionage umbrella, is the loss of sensitive 
data that may ultimately lead to grave danger.41 In December 2020, it was discovered that 
Russia had successfully infiltrated the network monitoring and management tools of the 
U.S. company SolarWinds.42 The effects of this cyberattack are projected to leave tens of 
thousands of its customers vulnerable to an attack, as well as compromising the security of 
hundreds of public companies and U.S. federal government agencies.43 Another risk, 
especially considering the insider threat, is the witting or unwitting personnel who have 
access to sensitive facilities, such as the sterile area of an airport, and can use their trusted 
positions for nefarious purposes.44 For example, in 2017, the U.S. Justice Department 
 
38 J. J. Green, “City of Secrets: Estimated 10,000 People in DC Are Spies,” 1, WTOP, June 17, 2019, 
https://wtop.com/j-j-green-national/2019/06/city-of-secrets-an-estimated-10000-dc-residents-are-spies-
heres-how-they-blend-in/. 
39 C. D. Edbrook, “Principles of Deep Cover,” Studies in Intelligence 5, no. Summer (1961): 31.  
40 Ursula M. Wilder, “The Psychology of Espionage, Why Spy?,” Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 
(June 2017): 18.  
41 National Counterintelligence Executive, (U) U.S. Insider Threat Security Classification Guide 
2013, Version 1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2013), 14, 18, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2016-00161.pdf. 
42 Christian T. Fjeld, “Hearings on the SolarWinds Hack and Possible Policy Responses,” 1, Insights 
Center, Mintz, February 23, 2021, https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2236/2021-03-04-
hearings-solarwinds-hack-and-possible-policy-responses. 
43 Fjeld, 1. 
44 “The ‘sterile area’ refers to portions of an airport defined in the airport security program that 
provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by the TSA, 
an aircraft operator, or a foreign air carrier.” Lisa S. Dean, Security Threat Assessment for SIDA and Sterile 
Area Workers (Washington, DC: Transportation Security Administration, 2004), 2, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_sida_sw_0.pdf. 
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indicted a dozen TSA and airport employees for being insider threats, who at the behest of 
unknown influence actors, used their positions of trust and access to sensitive areas of the 
aviation ecosystem to support and engage in nefarious activity.45  
While it is not possible to eliminate all threats, it is possible to reduce the 
probability of an attack. The human element is often the weakest link and offers the most 
risk in sensitive environments.46 As such, it is imperative to have a baseline understanding 
of the people who have authorized access. In many cases, this type of information can be 
collected in a routine manner. Some investigations however may require expanding the 
TSA’s current intelligence capabilities through organizational optimization, a defined 
collection management program with fully developed transportation intelligence priorities 
that align with national strategy, and an overt collection program that can collect threat 
information for maximum dissemination to the IC.  
To combat these protean security threats, it is necessary to consider new approaches 
in terms of intelligence organizations, processes, and culture.47 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While U.S. IC and LE agencies have been re-structured since 9/11 to respond to the 
types of attacks encountered at that time, these changes occurred from a reactionary posture 
and were deemed necessary to ensure the safety of America moving forward.48 In spite of 
these defensive measures, and per the 2019 National Strategy for Aviation, terrorist groups 
still find the aviation ecosystem an appealing operational target.49 For example, in 
 
45 District of Puerto Rico, U.S. Attorney’s Office, “Twelve Current and Former TSA and Airport 
Employees Indicted for Smuggling Approximately 20 Tons of Cocaine,” 1, Department of Justice, 
February 13, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/twelve-current-and-former-tsa-and-airport-
employees-indicted-smuggling-approximatley-20. 
46 Frank L. Greitzer et al., “Psychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based on Behavioral and 
Word Use Analysis,” Indiana University Press E-Service Journal 9, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 106–138.  
47 Laicie Heeley et al., Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America while Promoting Efficiencies 
and Accountability (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2018), 28, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=810501.  
48 Robert S. Mueller, III, “The FBI Transformation since 2001,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
September 14, 2006, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbi-transformation-since-2001. 
49 Trump, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 2.  
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December 2020, Cholo Abdi Abdullah was indicted as an operative of the overseas terrorist 
organization al Shabaab who was seeking to hijack an aircraft to carry out a September 11-
style attack.50 The aviation ecosystem provides terrorists a stage to inflict pain and death 
to the most people possible and with the publicity terrorists pursue.51 Appreciatively, the 
policies and procedures to thwart these types of attacks have been refined to greatly limit 
threats towards the United States.52 However, the last 20 years has seen an increase in 
domestic terrorism, transnational organized criminal activity, and espionage from bad 
actors resident in the homeland. This increase in activity has caused the U.S. IC and LE 
agencies to plan, budget, and reorganize their organizations to tackle these threats more 
effectively.53  
Within the DHS, refinement has advanced using multiple systems to collect vast 
amounts of information and then to analyze the data, in part, for vetting and watchlisting 
purposes.54 This type of work by the DHS, in collaboration with the IC, has shown to be 
effective in reducing the threats from outside U.S. borders.55 Recognizing the DHS’s 
effectiveness against threats, and given the enormous U.S. intelligence and security 
apparatus, consideration should be given to leverage the DHS’s collection of systems, 
policies, and procedures further to counter today’s more complex threats more fully.56 In 
doing so, the U.S. government needs to look no further than the components that make up 
the DHS and its intelligence capabilities. The components’ intelligence units are daily 
 
50 “Kenyan National Indicted for Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated 
Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab,” Office of Public Affairs, December 16, 2020, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kenyan-national-indicted-conspiring-hijack-aircraft-behalf-al-qaeda-
affiliated-terrorist. 
51 Trump, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 3. 
52 Goepner and Thrall, “Time to Step Back.” 
53 Heeley et al., Counterterrorism Spending, 28. 
54 Donald J. Trump, National Security Presidential Memorandum-9 (Washington, DC: White House, 
2018), 4, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NSPM-9%20Implementation%20Plan.pdf. 
55 John F. Kelly, “Home and Away: DHS and the Threats to America,” Department of Homeland 
Security, April 18, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/04/18/home-and-away-dhs-and-threats-america. 
56 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “The Secrets Next Door,” Washington Post, sec. Investigative, 
July 21, 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/top-secret-america/2010/07/21/secrets-next-
door/. 
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encountering all the threat streams described previously. Value can be further exploited 
through additional collection platforms, refined analysis, and standardized dissemination 
to the IC. One of those components is the TSA. 
The TSA is ideally positioned to access valuable data, which can be of further use 
in the U.S. fight to counter threats to the homeland. Currently, the U.S. government, 
specifically the IC, may not be taking full advantage of the information collected. Further, 
additional avenues for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are available. 
The TSA can contribute to these additional avenues. In talking about today’s current 
mission space and leveraging all available assets, former CIA Director Gina Haspel (2018–
2021) stated, “a bigger footprint…can get more done where it really counts.”57 This 
footprint not only applies to foreign partner liaisons, but also to further collaboration 
between U.S. government entities within the U.S. IC. 
The assets at the disposal of the U.S. government include the TSA’s daily 
encounters with multiple known or suspected terrorists (KSTs), the daily vetting of over 
20 million credentialed transportation employees and over two million airline passengers, 
as well as the continual engagement with foreign entities and international transportation 
stakeholders.58 These encounters provide the U.S. government one of the very few 
opportunities to be face-to-face with KSTs. During these events, the TSA can confirm or 
refute individuals’ identities and their KST status, as well as garner additional intelligence 
data points that may expand on the knowledge of these individuals. 
Additionally, the TSA conducts foreign airport assessments, air carrier inspections, 
and audits at foreign repair stations, which can be opportunities to provide valuable insights 
 
57 Gina Haspel, “CIA Director Gina Haspel Speaks at Auburn University,” para. 29, Central 
Intelligence Agency, April 18, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/cia-director-gina-haspel-speaks-at-
auburn-university/.  
58 “Secretary Nielsen Receives Operational Briefing on Israeli Security Technology, Delivers 
Remarks at the International Homeland Security Forum,” Department of Homeland Security, June 12, 
2018, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/12/secretary-nielsen-receives-operational-briefing-israeli-
security-technology-delivers. 
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about national intelligence priorities.59 By the nature of such interactions, these previously 
noted insights allow the TSA the ability to peer inside the personnel and operational 
functions of foreign entities. In doing so, the TSA may determine its credibility and value 
as international partners and hold them accountable to help protect the aviation 
ecosystem.60  
All these stated opportunities place the TSA in an advantageous position to collect 
a myriad of data on multiple events, whether through personal observation, technological 
means, or overt debriefings of DHS personnel and foreign partners. These opportunities 
could potentially enhance the IC’s analytic capabilities if properly collected and reported.  
However, due to interagency and bureaucratic reasons, the TSA’s valuable 
intelligence opportunities have not been fully implemented. One example was the May 
2021 cyberattack on the Colonial Pipeline, which led to confusion amongst U.S. 
government agencies and private industry partners.61 Additionally, legal ambiguity seems 
to occur over how aggressively the TSA can collect and disseminate intelligence.62 The IC 
moreover may not recognize the TSA’s full capabilities since it is primarily viewed as a 
security agency confined to U.S. airports. Such an interpretation of the TSA has minimized 
 
59 Examining TSA’s Global Efforts to Protect the Homeland from Aviation Threats and Enhance 
Security at Last-Point-of-Departure Airports: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security 
of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 1st sess., December 8, 
2015, 3, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806622. 
60 Jennifer Grover and Jessica Farb, Aviation Security TSA Strengthened Foreign Airport Assessments 
and Air Carrier Inspections, but Could Improve Analysis to Better Address Deficiencies, GAO-18-178 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688730.pdf. 
61 The TSA spreads its intelligence functions over multiple divisions and offices. While 
communication occurs between these units, there appears to be different internal positions on what efforts 
can or should be implemented to carry out intelligence activities. These differences include the TSA’s 
global strategies concerns of lost access to information should an unauthorized leak occur, the Field 
Intelligence Integration Division not having had an opportunity to expand the use of its deployed field 
intelligence officers’ collection and reporting capabilities, and the TSA’s intelligence analysis unit hidden 
away in vetting operations and, most striking, not exploiting the legal authorities available. 
62 The TSA is a derivative member of the IC by way of the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division’s 
statutory membership in the community. The TSA, along with seven other DHS components, have 
intelligence units that comprise the IE. However, the IE has not been thoroughly documented, nor have the 
IE authorities been fully recognized within the DHS, let alone the IC, to allow senior TSA leadership the 
clarity to carry out mandated intelligence functions. Mark A. Randol, Department of Homeland Security 
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, CRS Report No. 
R40602 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 3–4, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=27362. 
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its potential long-term contribution to transportation intelligence and may be limiting 
opportunities to mitigate or defeat ongoing threats. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that the TSA needs to enhance information sharing 
with the IC to mitigate threats to the United States. To enrich the partnership further 
between the TSA and U.S. IC, the IC should leverage the TSA’s position and access to 
valuable information and explore new collection opportunities. Indeed, the information the 
TSA currently collects provides an opportunity to add to the overall threat knowledge base. 
At this point, the opportunity cost in failing to improve the TSA’s intelligence collection 
is an overall loss of intelligence that can possibly be usefully applied by multiple U.S. IC 
and LE agencies against the diverse threats America is currently facing.  
To illustrate the IC’s available opportunity to increase its footprint by way of the 
TSA, this thesis explores the existing legal authorities and policies that can justify the 
expansion of the TSA’s support to intelligence. While current legislation is not definitive 
regarding the TSA’s ability to further its intelligence functions, the framework to justify 
any expansion is provided. This thesis aspires to identify how the IC can benefit and gain 
an advantage in its fight against ongoing threats by leveraging the TSA’s position and 
access to information through legal authorities that formally recognize transportation 
intelligence, defined collection management, appropriate staffing alignment, advanced 
training, and the establishment of a debriefing program.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the U.S. IC better leverage the TSA’s position and access to valuable 
information to enhance its efforts against ongoing threats to U.S. national security?  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis began with a reflection of the attacks on the United States in 2001 and 
the creation of the TSA, followed by the threats to the United States. From there, this thesis 
explored the unclassified literature on the threats facing America today and the IC’s 
responsibilities since 9/11, as well as the TSA’s intelligence support. Next, this thesis 
looked at the detailed role of TSA’s intelligence operations, how this role would fit into 
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the DHS and the IC, and discussed the TSA’s operating authorities. After that, the thesis 
examined existing legislation and policies to guide intelligence activity, and the TSA’s 
possible use of the legislation and policies in its intelligence functions. Finally, the thesis 
presented recommendations to guide the TSA in moving forward with enhanced 
intelligence capabilities.  
This thesis relied on primary sources, such as legislation, official government 
documents, and hearings related to the IC and the TSA. Secondary sources, such as books, 
academic journal articles, and reports, including Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
reports, documentaries, theses, and newspaper articles were also used.  
E. THESIS OUTLINE  
Chapter II provides a literature review of scholars debating the threats facing 
America today, the role the U.S. IC is playing to defeat the threats and the TSA’s current 
role in intelligence. Then, Chapter III presents the TSA’s current operations and the 
legislation under which it operates. Chapter IV provides the legal framework that justifies 
any enhanced intelligence efforts by the TSA to support the national intelligence cycle.63 
Finally, Chapter V provides findings, recommendations to enhance the TSA’s support to 
intelligence, and then a conclusion, as well as proposals and recommendations for future 
research. 
 
63 The national intelligence cycle includes the planning and direction (requirements), collection of raw 
information, processing, analysis, and dissemination of finished intelligence products. The national 
intelligence cycle is repeated as policy and decision makers questions are answered, and then disseminated 
analysis ultimately invokes new questions from intelligence customers and policy makers. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review presents scholarly works that discuss the threats facing 
America. This literature review also discusses different authors and scholars’ opinions on 
the IC’s role and changes since 9/11. Finally, this chapter provides a review of the literature 
that discusses the TSA’s current support to intelligence. 
A. THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 
Following al-Qaeda’s use of commercial airplanes to attack America in 2001, the 
U.S. government began the process of building and restructuring its IC and LE agencies. 
This process intended to eliminate the chance for a repeat attack in the same vein. One of 
the steps in this process was the creation of the TSA. The TSA was created specifically to 
secure the nation’s transportation network, with an emphasis on the screening of airline 
passengers. The literature review on the threats facing America follows. 
As an investigative response to the September 2001 attacks, the U.S. government 
established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 
Commission) to investigate and present the findings surrounding the September 11 
attacks.64 The Commission reported the U.S. government viewed overseas terrorist 
organizations as the number one threat to U.S. national security. Specifically, the 
Commission stated the U.S. government was concerned with “the threat posed by Islamist 
terrorism-especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”65 At that time, 
most pundits, journalists, and authors agreed that the overseas terrorist threat was the top 
priority.  
Almost two decades later, some still espouse overseas terrorism as the number one 
threat. The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states, “radical Islamist terrorist 
remain the primary transnational terrorist threat to the United States and its vital 
 
64 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
65 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 362.  
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interests.”66 Even further, former National Security Advisor John R. Bolton (2018–2019), 
proclaimed the terrorism “landscape [is] more fluid and complex than ever” and stated 
“radical Islamist militants” to be the greatest threat facing America today.67 In January 
2019, when addressing members of the U.S. Senate, former DNI Dan Coats (2017–2019) 
informed lawmakers “terrorism remains a persistent threat and in some ways is positioned 
to increase.”68 Going further, Mr. Coats claimed, “while ISIS is nearing territorial defeat 
in Iraq and Syria, the group has returned to its guerilla warfare roots while continuing to 
plot attacks and direct its supporters worldwide.”69 Overseas terrorism remains a threat to 
the United States, but may not be as imminent a threat. 
In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Matthew Jackson contended, “even though 
almost all of their [ISIS] territory has been lost, ISIS still poses a grave threat to the 
American homeland.”70 Mr. Jackson was further concerned about the “100,000 former 
ISIS fighters” who might be released from detention and “could recapture old territory and 
launch more attacks around the world.”71 The concern about current ISIS capabilities is 
not lost on the U.S. government. According to the 2021 IC Annual Threat Assessment, 
America still faces threats from overseas terrorist groups, such as ISIS.72 However, the 
assessment contends that “sustained U.S. and allied CT pressure has broadly degraded their 
 
66 Trump, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America, 7.  
67 Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt, “Terrorist Threat ‘More Fluid and Complex than Ever,’ White 
House Says,” New York Times, sec. United States, para. 2, October 4, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/us/politics/trump-counterterrorism-strategy.html. Webpage quote 
found in 2nd paragraph. 
68 Daniel R. Coats, DNI Coats Opening Statement on the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 19, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1949-dni-coats-opening-
statement-on-the-2019-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community. 
69 Coats, 19.  
70 Matthew L. Jackson, “America’s Three Domestic Threats and the Need for a Reform of Domestic 
Intelligence” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 12, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/66087/20Sep_Jackson_Matthew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllow
ed=y. 
71 Jackson, 12.  
72 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=852427. 
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[ISIS] capability,” and that “U.S.-based lone actors and small cells with a broad range of 
ideological motivations pose a greater immediate domestic threat.”73 
The United States is no longer concerned with solely countering threats from 
overseas terrorist organizations akin to al-Qaeda and ISIS. In 2014, Mike German, a Fellow 
at the Brennan Center for Justice, interviewed author and professor Dr. Erik Dahl who 
stated, “the nature of the domestic terrorism threat in the United States today is actually 
more serious, more severe than many believe it is—especially when you consider that there 
are a number of plots that have been thwarted since 9/11 from domestic right-wing or other 
sorts of organizations.”74 Dr. Dahl is not alone in this belief. Indeed, right-wing groups in 
America associate with “violence at all levels and seem to view violence as axiomatic in 
the movement,” according to Christopher Adamczyk in his master’s thesis.75 Further, Mr. 
Adamczyk stated, “groups like RTT [Revolt through Tradition], the AWD [Atomwaffen 
Division], even Patriot Front revel in violence and…motivate adherents to commit violent 
acts.”76 According to a 2021 project by the think tank New America, since 2001, “far-right 
terrorism,” which includes “anti-government, militia, white supremacist, and anti-abortion 
violence,” has killed 114 people in the United States, compared to 107 people killed in the 
United States by jihadist militants during the same timeframe.77 In line with the New 
America report, Michael C. McGarrity, former Assistant Director of the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division (2018–2019), in May 2019 told the U.S. House Homeland 
Security Committee “domestic terrorists pose a present and persistent threat of violence 
and economic harm.”78 Mr. McGarrity indirectly confirmed the New America reporting in 
 
73 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 23.  
74 Mike German, “Rethinking Intelligence: Interview with Erik Dahl,” para. 20, Brennan Center for 
Justice, June 6, 2014, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/rethinking-intelligence-
interview-erik-dahl. 
75 Christopher J. Adamczyk, “Gods versus Titans: Ideological Indicators of Identitarian Violence” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 54, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=847107. 
76 Adamczyk, 54. 
77 Peter Bergen et al., “Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?,” New America, para. 
3, 2021, http://newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/.  
78 McGarrity, “Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in the Homeland,” para. 4.  
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his statement to the committee that “there have been more arrests and deaths caused by 
domestic terrorists than international terrorists in recent years.”79  
In contrast, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), while not discounting the 
domestic terrorism threats, has written that the definition of domestic terrorism is too 
liberal.80 The ACLU states that Public Law 107-52 (USA PATRIOT ACT) allows for the 
prosecution of domestic terrorism when an individual’s acts are “dangerous to human life” 
and should only be applied when acts “cause serious physical injury or death.”81 There 
appears to be grey area when considering which threats are more pervasive and of a higher 
priority. 
To identify the U.S. threat priorities, the literature provides a definition of the 
National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). The 2018 National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategic Plan defines the NIPF as a mechanism 
that “reflects policymakers’ priorities for national intelligence support and ensures that 
enduring and emerging intelligence issues are addressed.”82 Further, former Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet (1997–2004) described the NIPF “as being more 
flexible and more precise than any previous intelligence priority system.”83 The details of 
the NIPF are classified and therefore this thesis is unable to list the actual intelligence 
priorities. However, the absence of classified details does not detract from the thesis’ 
analysis. 
 
79 McGarrity, para. 4.  
80 The ACLU believes that the Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-52) definition 
of domestic terrorism is written “broad enough to encompass the activities of several prominent activist 
campaigns and organizations. Greenpeace, Operation Rescue, Vieques Island, and WTO protesters and the 
Environmental Liberation Front have all recently engaged in activities that could subject them to being 
investigated as engaging in domestic terrorism.” “How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines ‘Domestic 
Terrorism,’” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed June 14, 2021, https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-
patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism. 
81 American Civil Liberties Union, para. 1.  
82 William R. Evanina, National Counterintelligence and Security Center Strategic Plan, 2018–2022 
(Washington, DC: National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2018), 12, 
https://www.odni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/2018-2022-NCSC-Strategic-Plan.pdf. 
83 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Los Angeles: QC Press, 2017). 
The NIPF “allowed policy makers and intelligence officers to identify the countries or non-state actors of 
interest and their activities that are of interest and then to give them relative levels of importance as 
intelligence priorities.” Lowenthal, XX. 
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However, the 2019 United States National Intelligence Strategy, which supports 
national security priorities, addresses the “threats [which] are becoming ever more diverse 
and interconnected,” to include traditional adversaries like Russia, China, Iran, and North 
Korea, as well as cyber threats, emerging technologies, violent extremist groups, and the 
increase in migration and urbanization populations.84 Looking further, the IC’s 2019 
World Threat Assessment (WTA), puts a significant precedence on traditional state actors. 
The WTA, like the NIS, sees Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as imminent and long-
term adversaries using multiple threat scenarios against the United States.85 The WTA 
does address overseas terrorist organizations, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), 
counterintelligence, and emerging and disruptive technologies, but is focused on the 
actions from state-level actors.86 The WTA does not advertise how the United States, 
specifically the IC, plans to respond to today’s threats.  
While overseas terrorism, domestic terrorism, and traditional threat actors are high 
priority targets for the U.S. government, the threat from TOCs pose just as much risk. The 
TSA is not immune from the threats presented by TOCs. According to the Global Initiative 
against Transnational Organized Crime, TOC actors’ use of “air travel has been a key 
conduit of illicit goods, most of which goes undetected,” and the majority of the movement 
of illicit goods “take place on commercial airlines.”87 A recent report by RAND presents 
the emergent threat of TOC actors as a “hybrid” that “combines aspects of criminal 
organizations, terrorist groups, and insurgencies,” and believes TOCs “pose crosscutting 
threats to U.S. security interest.”88  
 
84 Coats, National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 4.  
85 Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 5–11, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. 
86 Coats, 12–13. 
87 Summer Walker et al., The Global Illicit Economy: Trajectories of Transnational Organized Crime 
(Geneva, Switzerland: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021), 26, 
https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/The-Global-Illicit-Economy-GITOC-Low.pdf.  
88 Rabasa et al., Counternetwork, XVI.  
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Viewing TOCs as a hybrid has not gone unnoticed at the TSA. Over the last seven 
years, according to the TSA’s Insider Threat Roadmap, the TSA has encountered several 
incidents involving TOC actors. One example, as mentioned in Chapter I was a 2018 event 
that busted several airline workers for smuggling illegal drugs, for a TOC group, onto 
departing aircraft.89 This illegal activity not only involved TOC actors, but the recruitment 
of insiders who exploited their access to secure areas within an airport for illegal activity. 
In some cases, the insiders transported, carried, or passed along prohibited or dangerous 
items.90 Along with the TOC and insider threat, the TSA is concerned that a “terrorist 
could exploit the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the transnational criminal 
organizations” in an effort to recruit credentialed TSA insiders.91 
B. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TODAY 
This thesis proposes that the TSA is not only an airport security administration, but 
it can also contribute more to U.S. national security. The TSA was formed because of the 
attacks in 2001. Its mission is heavily focused on airport security. However, Chapter I 
provided examples of the threats facing the TSA today, from overseas terrorist 
organizations, domestic terrorists with a spectrum of ideological beliefs, to TOC actors and 
the insider threat actors willing to take advantage of their privileged access. The examples 
in Chapter I show how the TSA is responding to a wide range of complex threats, both 
domestically and overseas, and how the TSA’s mandate from 20 years ago has shifted. Just 
as the IC and the members within the IC have transformed over the last two decades, the 
TSA in 2021, needs to make organizational changes to support the IC better. 
Today’s IC looks different than it did 20 years ago. The IC is now led by the DNI, 
as opposed to the DCI. The IC has more statutory members, such as the Space Force. The 
2021 intelligence budget was just under 86 billion dollars, which continually increased 
over the 20 years, and might be necessary to confront all the existing threats to the United 
 
89 Pekoske, Insider Threat Roadmap 2020, 6.  
90 Pekoske, 6.  
91 Pekoske, Executive Summary, 3. 
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States.92 According to the Homeland Security Affairs journal, most of the changes in the 
IC occurred due to a strategic event, such as the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, or the al-Qaeda 
attack in 2001. Both of these events shook America, and “serve [d] as the impetus to 
reevaluate national policies,” and “alter strategic policy in a fundamental ways.”93 The 
TSA was created due to such a devastating attack on America. A new attack however 
should not have to occur for the TSA to transform its capabilities.  
In her speech to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
TSA former Acting Deputy Administrator Patricia F. S. Cogswell stated, “TSA’s continued 
success is contingent upon our ability to rise to the challenge of outmatching a dynamic 
threat to our aviation and surface transportation systems.”94 Going further, TSA 
Administrator David Pekoske told the U.S. Senate, “to be effective and efficient in a 
changing environment, TSA must continuously re-evaluate how it [TSA] uses its resources 
and performs its mission.”95 For the TSA to support the IC efforts, by enhancing the TSA’s 
intelligence functions, fundamental changes need to be made within the organization. 
Based on the previous comments, the TSA is aware change should occur. Over the years, 
the IC has transformed either by a tragic event, or by choice. 
While not on the same scale, the TSA can follow the lead of the CIA by choosing 
to modify its organization to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Citing the need to adapt to 
surging threats, Greg Miller of the Washington Post reported, “the CIA unveiled a radically 
altered org chart,” which came complete with “the most ambitious addition…the 
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Directorate of Digital Innovation [DDI].”96 The DDI is an answer to the fact that “the 
CIA’s mission is under digital assault.”97 The DDI architect, former CIA Director John 
Brennan (2013–2017), advocated for breaking down “the silos and cultural blockades” that 
impeded the agency’s abilities.98 Through such transformation, Mr. Brennan believes 
“agencies are better able to connect data points,” and “if the same data points that were 
available prior to 9/11 were available today, there never would have been a 9/11.”99 Truly 
a bold comment.  
Respected author Amy Zegart and former Deputy Director and Acting Director of 
the CIA Michael Morell (2012–2013) recognize the shifting threat landscape and agree that 
the IC needs to transform to meet the challenge. However, Zegart and Morell believe the 
intelligence agencies have not progressed quickly enough.100 They point to the Russian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and see that interference as a current 
intelligence failure.101 These types of gaps need to be filled. 
Identifying an opportunity to enhance agencies’ capabilities to defend the homeland 
is imperative for the TSA to defeat the threats identified in Chapter I. The TSA, while 
nascent in intelligence experience, is a readily available U.S. government asset that can 
extend its current mission in support of the IC. 
C. TSA’S CURRENT ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE  
The literature on the TSA’s intelligence role is limited in the public forum because 
the TSA’s intelligence work is classified. However, the DHS Office of Inspector General 
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(DHS OIG) states the TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (TSA I&A) mission “is 
to identify security risks to prevent attacks against the United States transportation 
system.”102 The Heritage Foundation’s, David Inserra, a former policy analyst for 
homeland security and cyber policy, believes the TSA is strictly a security agency focused 
on aviation, and therefore, “privatizing the TSA would result in savings that could be 
reinvested in more effective homeland security programs that need the additional funding 
and could also improve security across the U.S.”103 However, the literature shows the TSA 
plays a part in multiple transportation vectors. The Office of the Federal Register indicates 
that the “TSA employs a risk-based strategy…working closely with stakeholders in 
aviation, rail, transit, highway, and pipeline sectors, as well as the partners in the law 
enforcement and intelligence community.”104 Going further, the Register notes that the 
TSA “will continuously set the standard for excellence” with its “use of intelligence to 
drive operations.”105  
Senior government officials debate the TSA’s expanded role in intelligence. For 
example, a December 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report reviewed the 
TSA’s intelligence cooperation with the U.S. interstate pipeline system. The report found 
TSA I&A “provide [s] pipeline industry security professionals with timely and actionable 
information on terrorist threats,” and “provides quarterly intelligence briefings,” regarding 
“threat actors, credible terrorist plots, and successful attacks.”106 While the report believes 
the TSA can be more engaged with the pipeline sector, the report notes that pipeline 
officials are less concerned with receiving additional TSA I&A intelligence guidance, as 
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“the threats to the oil and natural gas sector have been historically low.”107 However, in 
May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company had to cease its pipeline operations due to a 
ransomware attack, which caused delays in production and shipment of necessary oil along 
the U.S. Eastern Shore. A May 2021 report by the CRS concurs that all regulation between 
private stakeholders, such as the Colonial Pipeline Company and the U.S. federal 
government, have been on a voluntary basis for both physical security and 
cybersecurity.108 Such an impactful incident should draw interest from both the private 
and public sectors to collect and share valuable intelligence. 
In the same vein, Jesse Cohen points out that the TSA is “responsible for setting 
and managing the security programs” of not just passengers but also the screening of cargo 
shipments.109 Cohen does not indicate whether cargo screening falls within the TSA’s 
intelligence section. Recognizing however that the mission is “to detect and prevent 
explosives in a cargo shipment from boarding an aircraft, and to ensure the security of the 
crew,” it is directly related to countering terrorism and the continued threat to the United 
States.110  
In response to a House oversight committee hearing, former U.S. Representative 
John Mica (R-Fla) (1993–2017), stated that he would like to see the TSA hand over the 
screening business to private security companies and focus “on intelligence to identify and 
address threats.”111 Rep. Mica believes connecting the dots, through “handling classified 
information, information on terrorists, the ability to track people, to make sure the 
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(terrorist) watchlist is up to date, so people are identified even before they get to the 
airport,” is of most value.112  
To the public, the TSA appears to be a security organization constrained to U.S. 
airports whose expanded mission is limited. Taking into consideration the need to maintain 
privacy and limit the collection of information on U.S. citizens, who do not have a nexus 
to terrorism or are a national security threat, many Americans can be presumed hesitant if 
the TSA expands its intelligence responsibilities. The public’s response to the TSA’s Quiet 
Skies (QS) program is an indication. 
Most of the authors who have written about the TSA have not covered the TSA’s 
intelligence activities. However, after a 2018 open-source report detailed that the TSA 
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was conducting surveillance and documenting 
pattern-of-life and atmospheric data on non-watchlisted individuals, the DHS OIG opened 
an investigation.113 The DHS OIG report found that the “TSA did not properly plan, 
implement, and manage the Quiet Skies program to meet the program’s mission of 
mitigating the threat to commercial aviation posed by higher risk passengers.”114 
Regardless of the DHS OIG report, many authors covering this story simply summarized 
the program as domestic surveillance. As of December 2018, the TSA has said it “curtailed 
its controversial ‘Quiet Skies’ domestic surveillance program.”115  
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Such activity caused concern with the public, and just adds to the suspicion people 
already maintain toward the TSA.116 According to a 2019 ProPublica article, the TSA full-
body scanners may have discriminated against African American women, due to certain 
types of headwear.117 According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, this type of 
reporting, expectedly, creates a backlash toward the TSA and allowed critics to surmise the 
TSA is already collecting too much invasive information.118 
Upon moving further away from 9/11, many authors agree that the threats the 
United States faces are more diverse than just overseas terrorist organizations. Today’s 
higher priority threats, such a domestic terrorism and transnational organized crime, have 
an impact on the TSA. Defeating the threats from overseas terrorist organizations will 
always be a priority for the TSA. The TSA can transform itself, as some members of the 
IC have done, so that the TSA can better position itself for the future.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided scholarly works that discussed the threats facing America. 
This chapter also discussed different authors and scholars’ opinions on the IC’s changes 
since 9/11. Finally, this chapter provided a review of the literature that discussed the TSA’s 
current support to intelligence. 
The next chapter presents the authorities that guide the TSA’s operational activities, 
and the TSA’s current role supporting the U.S. IC. Chapter III then provides an overview 
of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE), as well as the TSA’s place within the DHS 
IE. Finally, Chapter III details the rules and regulation the TSA operates under and ends 
with a breakdown of the TSA’s support to U.S. intelligence. 
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III. TSA TODAY: CURRENT OPERATIONS AND AUTHORITIES 
This chapter discusses the authorities that guide the TSA’s operational activities, 
and its current role supporting the U.S. national intelligence. It starts with an overview of 
the DHS IE, and a discussion of the TSA’s place within the DHS IE. This chapter then 
details the rules and regulation the TSA operates under and ends with a breakdown of the 
TSA’s support to U.S. intelligence.  
To most people, the TSA is viewed strictly as a security agency that functions 
primarily within the U.S. airports. The public believes the TSA is only responsible for the 
screening of passengers and luggage. Since 9/11, the public and media discussions 
surrounding the TSA’s creation have identified the entirety of the TSA in this manner. 
Some analysis reporting states that the TSA’s existence is not justified, the TSA should be 
privatized, and the TSA’s funding should be given to other DHS programs.119 These issues 
were highlighted in Chapter II. However, the research for this thesis indicates the TSA is 
required by law to function beyond airport security to protect against threats to the 
American public and the U.S. transportation infrastructure.120  
The majority of the TSA’s workforce, approximately 50,000 employees, is 
composed of the visible Transportation Security Officers, who are focused on securing the 
sterile areas within U.S. airports.121 An also unseen cadre of TSA employees is working 
to defeat threats before they reach the airports or the U.S. border. These officers have a 
mandate that extends beyond the transportation security realm, to include counterterrorism 
and counterintelligence operations, and their contributions support the U.S. government’s 
work to defeat multiple threats through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
relevant intelligence.122  
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In the TSA’s support to U.S. national security, the TSA’s greatest attention is on 
defeating threats to the aviation ecosystem.123 Most of the formidable threats are countered 
through the vetting of airline passengers, the forward and recurrent vetting of the 
credentialed transportation workforce, and the watchlisting of KSTs.124  
The following section illustrates the DHS’s place within the IC through the DHS 
I&A, the DHS I&A authorities within the IC, and the DHS I&A’s and DHS IE’s 
interactions with U.S. intelligence. This section then provides the TSA’s related legislation 
to engage in intelligence activities, and the intelligence functions the TSA can and cannot 
perform. 
A. TSA’S POSITION AND AUTHORITIES  
The TSA, one component of the DHS, is a member of the DHS IE, yet not a 
statutory member of the IC. The DHS IE is comprised of the DHS components that support 
U.S. intelligence activities, including, for example, United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the United States Secret Service.125 
Each of these components maintains at least one intelligence function, which is termed the 
Component Intelligence Program (CIP).126 Each CIP provides the DHS with analysis and 
threat warnings on homeland security priorities relevant to each component’s mission, and 
propagates the sharing of information with multiple government partners.127 The DHS IE 
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falls under the umbrella of the DHS I&A, which is a statutory member of the IC.128 The 
DHS I&A’s statutory IC membership provides a pathway for each CIP member to provide 
intelligence collection to contribute to improved IC analysis of potential threats to the 
United States’ national security. This thesis argues that the pathway to the IC is an 
opportunity for the TSA to expand its intelligence capabilities with existing legal 
authorities and policies.  
Currently, 18 agencies make up the U.S. IC, which include two independent 
agencies, the ODNI and the CIA.129 Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
nine IC organizations: the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and five 
intelligence elements within each of the military services, which includes the newest IC 
member, the Space Force.130 Additionally, seven IC members fall within larger 
organizations that maintain functions outside of intelligence, which include the Department 
of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, USCG Intelligence, 
Department of Justice’s FBI National Security Branch, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s (DEA’s) Office of National Security Intelligence, Department of State’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, and the DHS I&A.131  
When the DHS was established, it was designed to be “a concerted national effort 
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”132 While 
considered a colossal task, the DHS was created as a headquarters element responsible for 
multiple incoming components, even subsuming the newly created TSA from the 
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Department of Transportation.133 Each of these components, sans the TSA, joined the 
ranks of the DHS having held long established processes and independent organizational 
identities, with some already having established intelligence functions. The blending of the 
DHS CIPs with the DHS I&A has been an ongoing process. No formal legislation has been 
established to standardize the national intelligence cycle at the department level to which 
the DHS IE can adhere. The following section discusses the DHS I&A charter and how it 
engages with the DHS IE. 
1. DHS I&A and the Intelligence Enterprise 
The DHS I&A represents the entire DHS for the IC, and is tasked with collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence for the DHS to the IC.134 Multiple laws and 
regulations, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, give the DHS I&A its charter 
to identify and deter threats that come from within the borders of the United States. 
Together, these laws, such as Executive Order (EO) 12333, as well as the NSA 47, provide 
the direction and oversight instructions that guide the DHS I&A to fulfill its national 
security requirements.135 The DHS I&A is required to support national security through 
the collection and analysis of information gathered at the department and field levels.  
For the last 19 years, the DHS I&A has taken on multiple roles within the DHS. At 
times, the DHS I&A functions as a headquarters element that maintains a strategic posture, 
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guides the DHS components with ad-hoc requirements, and extends its analysis and 
capabilities to the CIP. This structure is similar to that of the DOD. The Department of the 
Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force all report to the DOD. 
Other times, the DHS I&A positions itself in a support role to the DHS components, as 
well as provides non-strategic intelligence to state, local, and tribal affiliates. As such, the 
DHS I&A is unique among the other IC members. For example, the DHS I&A was integral 
in the creation of the national fusion centers and the communication network to pass along 
sensitive but unclassified information to mission partners.136 The DHS I&A has not been 
able to stick with one role because no legislation requires the DHS to unify the DHS IE 
regarding engagement with the DHS IE components.  
However, in 2020, the U.S. Senate passed the Unifying DHS Intelligence 
Components Act (UDHSIC) to govern and provide direction throughout the department’s 
intelligence activities, as it pertains to standardizing intelligence collection and analysis 
training.137 However, this act limits the possibility to unite the DHS IE. Intelligence 
priorities and requirements fundamental in directing an intelligence organization in its 
collection efforts are not addressed.  
Setting strategic priorities for an intelligence organization is necessary for the 
organization to understand the direction it is going. The DHS I&A Strategic Plan for Fiscal 
Year 2011–2018 noted the DHS created a Homeland Security Intelligence Priority 
Framework (HSIPF). The research however does not show that the framework has been 
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incorporated throughout the DHS IE.138 In this plan, the HSIPF was defined as a “unified 
set of homeland security information priorities” within the IC. The HSIPF is not dependent 
on, but linked to, the NIPF.139 However, this plan did not explain how the HSIPF was used 
and if it was used by the DHS CIP units within DHS I&A.140 Additionally, and like the 
UDHSIC Act, this plan made no mention of transportation intelligence requirements that 
the TSA could use to guide its intelligence collection. This type of structure and operating 
procedure has created gaps in intelligence collection and has led to criticism of the overall 
intelligence products the DHS I&A has produced.141 
Indeed, in a 2011 review of the DHS I&A’s work, the Center for Investigative 
Reporting determined that the DHS I&A’s intelligence products were not on par with the 
IC and did not provide much value to America’s overall intelligence mission.142 In this 
connection, Becker and Schultz note that the DHS I&A’s intelligence “reports [to the IC] 
have been outdated, irrelevant or vague, or have regurgitated stories that appeared in the 
media,” and thus equate I&A’s work to “intelligence spam.”143 A more recent (2016) 
review by the House Homeland Security Committee determined that even though the DHS 
I&A improved the flow of intelligence, the DHS did not lead its IE appropriately. The DHS 
IE lacks direction in its missions, has not been provided a concrete intelligence policy, and 
the “unique contributions the [component intelligence units] can make to our nation’s 
security…are not easily accessible.”144 While the DHS I&A has the charter to synthesize, 
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evaluate, and disseminate intelligence that it garners from the DHS IE components, it has 
so far failed to coalesce all the components intelligence units into one functioning 
intelligence provider. In sum, a more refined structure of the DHS I&A and the components 
of the DHS IE, through legal or formal policy, could produce more thorough intelligence 
products to pave the way to ensure all avenues of intelligence collection and dissemination 
occur. 
2. TSA and its Operating Authorities 
As is commonly known, the TSA was established after the terrorist attacks in 2001. 
The TSA acts as a deterrent to any future attacks on the U.S. transportation system through 
its operational and analytic activities. Several rules and regulations, including the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), give the TSA its ability to protect against 
the threats to America’s public transportation sector. These authorities work in conjunction 
with one another. For example, some pieces of legislation, like EO 12333 and the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), were enacted to 
regulate or guide intelligence activities, while the others were created specifically to 
address the DHS and the TSA. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) 
and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Integration and Use of Screening 
Information to Protect against Terrorism were written to mandate the TSA to share 
terrorism information with the national security community. Finally, the Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension, Safety, and Security Act (FAA ESSA) of 2016 guides the TSA 
on the vetting operation for individuals seeking or currently working in the credentialed 
transportation workforce.  
In line with ATSA, the TSA fulfils the following tasks that include providing 
security for the U.S. public transportation sector, screening operations for all passenger and 
intrastate air transportation, and controlling access to secure areas in an airport.145 Most 
people are familiar with these actions and exposed to them daily within the airports. 
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However, in 2004, the U.S. Congress released the IRTPA legislation to reform the IC.146 
The IRTPA provided instruction and guidelines to the TSA on aviation security, air cargo 
security, and maritime security to enhance security measures to the transportation 
sector.147  
Through the IRTPA legislation, the TSA was directed to establish a pre-flight 
passenger prescreening program that compared both domestic and international traveler 
information to the No-Fly and Selectee sections of the Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) 
consolidated watchlist (TSDB).148 The pre-flight passenger prescreening program is 
known as Secure Flight.149 Further, IRTPA allows the TSA to maintain sub-programs 
within Secure Flight to pre-screen individuals “against the full TSDB or other records,” 
when necessitated by security considerations.150 These sub-programs of Secure Flight are 
known as Silent Partner (SP) and QS.151 As noted, the Secure Flight travel information is 
vetted against the TSC’s watchlist, and when a match results, or possible match against the 
watchlist, the TSA sends the encounter notification to the TSC, and may be assumed to be 
disseminated within the IC, if required.152 As a function of the Secure Flight program, the 
TSA reports that the FAMS submits after actions reports (AARs) on KST subjects that the 
FAMS has covered on a flight or in an airport.153 Given a FAMS law enforcement 
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background, the AARs may contain additional information on the KST subject, such as 
atmospheric data (appearance, demeanor, etc.), as well as associations with other 
individuals of interest to the IC. If not already, the TSA’s intelligence unit could serialize 
the AAR and use the information to write an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) and 
disseminate the raw intelligence to the IC.154 Such intelligence could have value to the 
right government agency, which could lead to operational action against subjects of 
interest.  
According to HSPD-6 and the MOU, once a passenger is confirmed as a KST 
identity, the TSA is required to relay collected terrorist information that meets the 
watchlisting guidance criteria. This information is submitted as a nomination to the 
National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) TIDE, which is an IC consolidated, classified 
terrorism identities database.155 The NCTC then submits unclassified person identifiers to 
the TSC for inclusion in the TSDB, which is then exported to the unclassified screening 
and vetting systems. Nominations can include new person identities associated with 
terrorism, or enhancements to existing person terrorism records.156  
This activity, known as watchlisting, is permitted by the TSA through EO 12333 
since the TSA is a member of the DHS IE. Individuals identified by SP or QS rules program 
are not considered KSTs The information collected by Secure Flight is not sent to the 
NCTC. The information on SP and QS subjects does not contain adequate derogatory 
information that qualifies an individual to meet the reasonable suspicion standard outlined 
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in the watchlisting guidance.157 For example, travelers whose flights resemble a known 
flight pattern used by identified terrorist organizations may find themselves on either the 
SP or QS list. This information however alone does not qualify the individuals for watchlist 
nominations.158 While a SP or QS person of interest does not meet the minimum watchlist 
nomination threshold, and is not nominated for inclusion in the TSDB, the information 
collected has potential value to the IC. The TSA should consider preparing an analytic 
report or IIR for IC dissemination. Additional analytical reporting opportunities are 
discussed in the next section. 
Finally, the FAA ESSA mandates the TSA to vet individuals seeking or currently 
working in the credentialed transportation workforce. The FAA ESSA requires the TSA to 
complete a security threat assessment (STA) to ascertain the risk posed by an individual 
with access to the secure side of an airport. FAA ESSA also directs the TSA to compare 
current threat streams with the requirements needed to be eligible for an aviation worker 
credential, as well as creating or adopting industry standards for measuring access to the 
secure side of an airport and improving the review of the aviation workforce.159 The TSA’s 
vetting operations are continuously vetting credentialed employee records against the 
TSDB and the National Crime Information Center, for the period during which the STA is 
valid.160 The TSA’s vetting operations ensure that insider threats to aviation security are 
adequately addressed. Indeed, the TSA’s vetting operations provide an excellent platform 
on which the TSA can expand its intelligence functions. The TSA is processing most of 
the vetting information on United States Persons (USPERs). USPER is a category of 
individuals on whom the IC can collect, but with greater restrictions than the TSA, per EO 
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12333. Such access to potential targets of interest with derogatory information, both 
domestically and overseas, presents opportunities to collect additional overt information 
that can add value to the IC. Serializing pertinent information from the TSA’s vetting cycle 
can also add value to the IC. Additional vetting opportunities are discussed in the following 
section.  
B. TSA’S SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE  
The TSA plays an instrumental role in supporting the efforts of the nation’s 
intelligence collection. Currently, all the intelligence functions inside the TSA reside with 
the TSA I&A. According to a recent review by the Homeland Security Committee, the 
TSA I&A has over 700 employees, with over 200 CIP personnel.161 These members are 
spread out over multiple divisions and branches and include the Field Intelligence 
Integration Division (FIID), the Transportation Analysis Division (TAD), three around-
the-clock watch floors, and the Vetting Analysis Division (VAD).162 Each contributes 
unique transportation intelligence to the national intelligence and law enforcement 
communities. The following paragraphs provide the functions of the TSA’s intelligence 
divisions and watch floors, as well as the extent of the TSA’s input to the U.S. national 
intelligence.  
The FIID works primarily through their Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs), with 
some headquarters personnel.163 The FIOs work within the U.S. airport environments and 
ensure senior TSA leadership stays informed on all intelligence and threat matters, as well 
as provide local authorities with need-to-know updates that can affect a stakeholder’s 
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interests.164 According to a recent job posting, the FIO position is also required to liaise 
with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force and the intelligence fusion centers.165 The FIO’s 
typical assignments include, “serving as a principal technical advisor on intelligence,” and 
“developing high level briefs…[for] the identification, consideration, and resolution of real 
or potential security threats.”166 However, if not already doing so, the FIOs represent an 
excellent platform for the TSA to increase its intelligence collection to include strategic 
debriefing.167 According to a 2017 DHS OIG report, the TSA only hires FIOs who have a 
deep understanding and experience in intelligence work. The FIOs must also demonstrate 
experience with supporting intelligence operations, preparing analytic briefs, assessing 
intelligence sources, as well as writing intelligence reports, such as the IIR.168 Chapter V 
provides a recommendation for expanding the FIOs’ intelligence roles within the TSA.  
In addition to overseeing the FIO program, the FIID maintains a presence at the 24/
7 Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC).169 The TSOC focuses on supporting 
security and intelligence operations in real-time, and in doing so, coordinates with multiple 
agencies on all aviation and transportation related events, operations, and emergency 
responses.170 The TSOC remains operationally ready with up-to-date intelligence and 
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serves as the primary transportation security liaison for law enforcement and national 
intelligence. The TSA’s TSOC maintains access to a web-based system (WebEOC) that 
receives information from multiple sources, to include authorities at the federal level 
through the tribal level, as well as from the private sector and international sources.171 The 
TSA’s Secure Flight provides the TSOC, through WebEOC, with the identities of travelers 
who match the TSDB (KSTs). The TSOC is then allowed to transmit this intelligence to 
the FIOs and FAMS so they remain knowledgeable and respond to incidents that may affect 
their areas of operation.172  
Two more 24/7 watch floors are manned within the TSA. The Indications and 
Warning Watch (IWW), which is run by the TAD, provides the TSA leadership, and the 
National Transportation Vetting Center (NTVC), with high-level threat information on the 
transportation sector.173 The IWW is vital to national intelligence. The IWWrelays 
actionable intelligence quickly to senior leaders in the TSA who are then able to coordinate 
with external agencies at a higher level. For example, the IWW, in coordination with the 
TSOC and NTVC, would have likely been involved in communicating up-to-the-minute 
intelligence to the TSA senior leadership during the 2021 Capitol Hill riots. Aside from 
running the IWW, the TAD maintains the SP and QS programs and is responsible for all 
strategic intelligence production coming from the TSA.174 The intelligence production 
from TAD is provided to other TSA offices, the TSA workforce at the airports, and to 
appropriately cleared transportation stakeholders like passenger airlines, cargo airlines, rail 
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partners, etc.175 Additionally, the TAD intelligence support to the TSA’s Global Strategies 
office helps direct overseas screening efforts and focuses on airports considered higher 
threats to the transportation sector.176 The NTVC is a 24/7 unit of watch officers and 
encounter analysts focused on the vetting and analysis of individuals who may pose a threat 
to national security and the aviation sector.177 The Transportation Vetting System (TVS) 
and Secure Flight, and the Encounter Analysis Branch (EAB), two systems used for vetting 
reside with the NTVC.178  
Using the TVS, the TSA conducts forward and recurrent vetting of the credentialed 
transportation workforce to identify those applicants seeking a transportation credential 
current credential holders having links to terrorism, or posing other risks to 
transportation.179 As an example, the TSA performs continual, recurrent vetting of 
individuals working within the sterile areas of the airports, who have obtained a TSA Pre-
Check privilege, hold FAA credentials, or are crewmembers on a flight.180 In 2015, the 
DHS OIG conducted an investigation into the TSA’s vetting capabilities, and found that 
the vetting process was failing.181 The DHS OIG found that the TSA had provided aviation 
credentials to 73 individuals with links to terrorism, which happened because the TSA did 
not have access to all the terrorism-related intelligence the U.S. government maintained.182 
Since the release of the DHS OIG report, it appears the TSA’s vetting efforts have proven 
effective at detecting links to terrorism within the credentialed population. No additional 
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reporting indicates the TSA has provided a transportation credential to an individual linked 
to terrorism.183  
The TSA’s vetting of credentialed employees and applicants supports the IC by 
keeping individuals with links to today’s threats away from secure areas in the 
transportation network. As an example, after the January 2021 Capitol Hill riots, reported 
as domestic terrorism, the U.S. Congress urged the TSA to identify all individuals involved 
in the attack and add them to the federal No-Fly List.184 Further, the information collected 
through the vetting process should provide information that the IC can analyze to uncover 
additional links to foreign and domestic terrorism, insider threats, and TOC activity. For 
example, a credentialed airline employee hits against the TVS, and initial analysis reveals 
no derogatory information, but reveals the credentialed individual shares an address with a 
subject in the TSDB, a KST. Upon further research, DHS data identifies the KST has an 
active student pilot’s license. More research, through FAA data, uncovers the KST is 
attending a flight school with unknown associates who share a phone number with the 
KST, as well as the same foreign address listed on their visas. The unknown associates do 
not appear in any available datasets. At this point, the TSA can provide more information 
to the IC. This topic is discussed in Chapter V.  
Just as valuable is the TSA’s Secure Flight program with SP focusing on identifying 
previously unknown individuals who may pose a higher risk based on their travel patterns 
and association. QS is also used as an extension of the SP in the domestic realm for the 
more imminent and critical SP ruleset.185 Ultimately, “Secure Flight allows TSA and [its] 
partners in the intelligence community to adapt quickly to new threats.”186 Secure Flight 
is a powerful and dynamic tool when it comes to terrorist travel. Secure Flight vets fully 
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known individuals on the TSDB, partially known, or completely unknown higher risk 
travelers through SP and QS, the internal TSA watchlist for known non-KST subjects, and 
transportation-related credential vetting to ensure no insider threats.187 The Secure Flight 
system is a quick way to identify any subjects who touch TSA equities. Secure Flight data 
being responded to by the FAMS, such as a KST on a particular flight, is being reported 
by the FAMS in an AAR.188 This chapter already noted that the AAR might be serialized, 
and the information could be used to increase the TSA’s intelligence efforts. However, 
when the FAMS is responding to a Secure Flight match, it can be leveraged for intelligence 
collection, such as collecting a DNA sample. This topic is discussed in Chapter IV.189 
The EAB is the last unit within the TSA that plays a critical role in support of the 
intelligence mission. The EAB is recognized as a DHS IE CIP member. The EAB “identif 
[ies] potential risks to transportation security by searching for, discovering, and analyzing 
previously unknown links, trends, or patterns among transportation sector workers and 
airline passengers.”190 For example, the EAB may discover a credential applicant has 
provided a unique piece of information (phone number, address, etc.) that associates to an 
individual in the TSDB. This connected information might warrant further analysis. The 
EAB works in coordination with the Secure Flight screening of airline passengers, as well 
as with the data collected through the forward and recurrent vetting of the TVS program. 
As a result of this analysis, the EAB may identify new information on an individual, or 
information that reveals an association with a KST, and will either enhance or submit a 
new watchlist nomination to the terrorist identities database.191 Depending on the type of 
information gathered, the EAB may “produce intelligence reports on TSA’s encounters 
with known or suspected terrorist.”192 Both actions, watchlisting and analytical reporting, 
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support the IC by providing one more piece of the puzzle and can help identify previously 
unknown or partially known individuals within the TSA systems. 
The research shows that the EAB conducts both strategic and tactical analysis on 
individuals within the transportation sector. However, the research does not indicate what 
type of intelligence the EAB uses for analysis, whether DHS only information, or a 
combination of DHS and IC data. As noted earlier in this chapter, the DHS OIG found that 
the TSA’s vetting of credentialed workers failed in 2015 because the TSA did not have all 
the IC data available to it. That begs the questions, does the TSA’s EAB use IC data in its 
analysis, and is the EAB still limited in what information it can review? If the EAB had 
access to a wealth of IC data, the TSA could enhance its intelligence functions through the 
EAB. The EAB could then conduct strategic analysis on the subjects encountered, to 
include pattern-of-life analysis, travel pattern analysis (to/from countries of interest), as 
well as analytic worked based on the FAMS AARs. Further, and just as important, are the 
EAB’s analytic efforts based on national intelligence requirements or internal TSA legacy 
requirements? If the EAB’s analysis is based on non-national priority requirements, then 
the TSA can enhance its support in this area to the IC. These points are discussed in Chapter 
V. 
Cited literature in this thesis illustrates the TSA’s support of U.S. intelligence 
efforts is focused on tactical and time sensitive operations. However, once executed, it is 
not clear how the TSA’s efforts translate into strategic intelligence that external customers 
can absorb. While the TSA’s watchlisting work does provide enduring analytic input by 
identifying potential terrorist travel and associations, the TSA can work to increase 
collection to contribute to an improved IC analysis of potential threats.193 When viewing 
the TSA as a whole, and considering its presence both domestically and internationally, it 
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would be fair to assume the TSA could also collect raw intelligence of value to the U.S. IC 
and LE communities, albeit with the USPERs’ names being redacted.194 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Unlike the other members of the DHS IE, the TSA was formed in response to a 
specific act and came into the fold without any historical precedence or guidance. At the 
time of the TSA’s creation, the United States was fearful that another terrorist attack that 
utilized the aviation sector was possible, and therefore, the United States created the TSA 
to focus on security within the airports. However, this chapter presented another side of the 
TSA, with which the public was not familiar. The media rarely reported on this issue. The 
TSA is more than just the security officers at the airport checking for contraband or odd 
behavior. The TSA is a national security agency that works to defend against numerous 
threats.195 This chapter identified the TSA’s current position within the DHS IE, the 
authorities sustaining the TSA’s operational objectives, and the TSA’s contribution to the 
national intelligence mission. The next chapter reviews the existing legal framework that 
can be used to increase the TSA’s support to the IC and the national intelligence cycle. 
  
 
194 The U.S. IC is limited in the “collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning 
unconsenting U.S. persons.” IC “minimization procedures generally provide for the substitution of a 
generic phrase or term, such as ‘U.S. person 1’ or ‘a named U.S. person’ when including the identity of the 
U.S. person does not meet dissemination criteria.” As such, the TSA would need to abide by these 
standards when sharing any U.S. person information with IC or LE partners. Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Office, Protecting U.S. Person Identities in Disseminations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(Washington, DC: Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2017), 1–2, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/CLPT-USP-Dissemination-Paper---FINAL-clean-11.17.17.pdf. 
195 “Through the end of fiscal year 2016, TSA’s behavior detection screening process was a stand-
alone program that used specially trained behavior detection officers to observe passengers at the screening 
checkpoint and engage the in brief verbal exchanges. If the behavior detection officers determined during 
this interaction that a passenger exhibited a certain number of behavioral indicators, the behavior detection 
officer was to refer the passenger for additional screening, or if circumstances warranted, contact a law 
enforcement officer.” William Russell, Aviation Security TSA Has Policies that Prohibit Unlawful 
Profiling but Should Improve Its Oversight of Behavior Detection Activities, GAO-19-490T (Washington, 
DC: Government Accountability Office, 2019), 2, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699485.pdf. 
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IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ENHANCE THE TSA SUPPORT 
TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
In 2002, and again in 2006, the USCG and the DEA, respectively, became official 
members of the U.S. IC.196 Both entities spent years working together with the IC, and 
produced valuable intelligence in the ever-present threats that face the United States. The 
USCG and DEA’s transition into the IC was a formalization of their existing performance, 
but also paved the way to remove organizational obstacles and provide both organizations 
enhanced access to information on national security.197 Over the last few years, it has been 
reported that both the CBP and ICE are working in tandem to petition the ODNI to 
transition their intelligence units out of the DHS IE and into the IC to become statutory IC 
members.198 These entities, like the USCG and DEA, believe they would gain more 
influence in setting national security priorities, as well as access to the National Intelligence 
Program (NIP) budget.199 Such a move may be considered beneficial to CBP and ICE, but 
such a consideration may not be necessary for the TSA. The TSA may already have the 
authority to participate in additional intelligence activities without statutory IC 
membership. 
Indeed, as an agency that operates both domestically and overseas, the TSA is 
situated to provide more value to the nation’s intelligence collection, and the IC should 
make a push to fully leverage TSA’s position and access. In this context, the existing laws 
and directives already address the issue of whether the U.S. government, specifically the 
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IC, can legally expand the TSA’s intelligence functions to answer national intelligence 
priority requirements.200 
This chapter reviews the existing legal framework with the view of identifying 
which of its components already validate increasing the TSA’s contribution to national 
intelligence without requiring new legislation. Exploring these authorities and gaining the 
necessary support from both within and outside the IC will allow the TSA to add valuable 
intelligence gains for the U.S. government immediately without the need for further 
legislation. 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 
To consider expanding the intelligence functions of the TSA, the foundation of the 
proposal must have merit and be thoughtfully presented to an audience who understands 
the value of unexplored opportunities. The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47), which 
predates the creation of the TSA, is the foundation of the IC and provides legal merit for 
enhanced TSA intelligence activity. While NSA 47 does not specifically address the TSA, 
it does address the capability to enhance the TSA’s intelligence functions. First, NSA 47 
clearly defines the components of the IC that includes the DHS I&A, which oversees the 
DHS IE, of which the TSA is a member. This topic was discussed in Chapter III. 
This act, in coordination with an agency or department head, such as the TSA 
Administrator, further states that the President of the United States or the DNI can 
designate any part of a U.S. agency or department to be a part of the IC.201 While this 
thesis is not proposing the TSA become a statutory member of the IC, NSA 47 provides a 
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contingency to assign IC status to an organization to accommodate national interests.202 A 
more likely scenario for the TSA is to rely on this act for legal justification to increase its 
intelligence programs to support IC members. 
As stated in NSA 1947, the DNI is responsible for providing national intelligence 
to the President, heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of 
Representatives and the committees. NSA 1947 is also required to provide national 
intelligence generated from multiple sources and be neutral, politically unbiased, and 
timely.203 In line with the DNI’s required access to intelligence, NSA 47 states that the 
DNI must be able to gain access to all national intelligence that has been collected by “any 
Federal department, agency, or other entity” unless explicitly defined by law.204 Therefore, 
NSA 47 clearly does not exclude the TSA from further intelligence participation. The TSA 
especially has the ability to collect and report on vital national intelligence, such as the 
actions and intentions of foreign national aviation partners, activities, and associates of 
domestic terror groups, as well as tracking and reporting on insider threats to the U.S. 
transportation network.  
Additionally, NSA 47 states that the terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence 
related to national security” describes “all-source” intelligence to all intelligence collected 
either domestically or overseas.205 It is fairly easy to envision the TSA supporting 
additional aspects of the IC and taking advantage of the TSA’s large domestic and overseas 
presence since it is existing member of the DHS IE, with current intelligence collection 
and analysis capabilities,.  
Further, the term “national intelligence program,” as stated in NSA 47, includes all 
activities, plans, and endeavors of the IC, including any other endeavors, with the consent 
of the President of the United States, or the DNI in coordination with an agency or 
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department head.206 The TSA as a whole does not need to seek statutory IC status, as NSA 
47 affords the DNI and the TSA Administrator the ability to designate one or more 
programs within the TSA with IC authorities and responsibilities.  
The initial authorities of NSA 47 have been considerably expanded through 2021 
and demonstrate Congress’ intent to provide more—not less—authority for the U.S. 
government, through the DNI, to gain intelligence capabilities.207 Collectively, the 
authorities are consistent with Congress’ intent and should be read together to provide legal 
authority for the larger IC to leverage the TSA’s intelligence division. The authorities have 
been delegated by statute to the DNI, which further demonstrates Congress’ willingness to 
allow DHS components to provide the IC expanded collection and analysis platforms in an 
increasingly challenging security context.208 The latitude given in this act provided legal 
justification for the TSA to establish an intelligence platform, such as an overt debriefing 
program that could be conducted in combination with the TSA’s FIOs, the TSA FAMS, 
and the TSA representatives (TSAR), and be guided and protected by established policies 
and legislation.209 
B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 
Should the TSA consider expanding its intelligence programs, it is vital that the 
TSA relies on more than one piece of legislation or policy. This section provides additional 
justification. Much like NSA 47, EO 12333, issued January 2018, addresses the U.S. 
intelligence activities, and also provides clear guidance to the DNI, and subordinate 
department heads. First, EO 12333 stipulates that to acquire insight on any threats toward 
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the United States, the intelligence must be of the highest quality and have been obtained 
through appropriate and legal means. The responsibility to analyze and disseminate 
intelligence falls on each department and agency within the IC.210 Therefore, the TSA is 
well positioned to support the IC, which must provide the DNI the highest quality 
intelligence since the TSA maintains the experts and relationships to report on the 
transportation sector, either domestically or overseas.  
Next, EO 12333 stipulates that in coordination with relevant organizational leaders, 
the DNI can seek the support of non-IC organizations to engage in the collection and 
analysis of intelligence pertinent to national security.211 As written, EO 12333 provides 
legal cover to enable the TSA to reach further in its collection and analysis of 
intelligence.212 The legal cover is consistent with the structure and authorities being used 
by the DHS CIPs under the DHS IE, as none of the CIPs have IC statutory status, but 
function under the regulations and laws outlined in EO 12333.213 Any additional 
intelligence activities the TSA seeks to conduct should also fall in line with EO 12333. 
In addition, EO 12333 stipulates that domestically, the FBI Director is responsible 
for overseeing all clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence 
activity used during foreign intelligence collection. The CIA Director is responsible for 
overseeing all clandestine HUMINT and counterintelligence activity used during foreign 
intelligence collection outside of the United States.214 This stipulation provides another 
opportunity for the TSA to contribute to the IC’s intelligence activity. Indeed, while the 
TSA would not be legally covered to engage in any type of clandestine activity, as a global 
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entity, the TSA could overtly engage with potential targets of interest. These targets include 
foreign governments, international air carriers, and foreign airport partnerships that can 
answer national requirements. The TSA can document and report any known or perceived 
threats, identify areas of vulnerability, as well as report on targets of potential interest to 
the IC, such as organizations and individuals. Within the United States, the TSA would fall 
under the purview and operational guidance of the FBI. Any activity overseas would be 
under the operational control of the DNI representative, colloquially known as the station 
chief. Overt collection by the TSA would not seek to impede on either the FBI or CIA’s 
mission, but only act as a force multiplier when natural access to information was 
necessary, or if transportation intelligence requirements had to be developed in line with 
traditional national requirements. 
In sum, the TSA maintains the experience, expertise, and domestic and foreign 
relationships in the global transportation network that can support the IC and its mandate 
to provide the DNI with the highest quality intelligence, through the collection and 
dissemination of information gathered due to the TSA’s position and access. Through EO 
12333, the TSA’s IC status is irrelevant. The DNI and the TSA Administrator are jointly 
authorized to use non-IC U.S. government entities in the collection and analysis of 
intelligence to meet national security demands. The TSA is positioned domestically and 
overseas to capture information on individuals and organizations linked to overseas 
terrorism. The TSA can also obtain information on people who may display ideological 
tendencies to support and engage in domestic terrorism, as well as identify anyone who 
seeks to cause harm from inside the transportation sector. All this information, if captured 
and reported in accordance with IC standards, such as the IIR, could provide one more 
piece to the large puzzle.  
C. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE—900 
The legal foundation for the TSA to enhance its intelligence collection and analysis 
has been set with the two previous pieces of legislation. This section provides the TSA 
with the best pathway to begin the discussion, on additional intelligence activities, with the 
appropriate senior leadership. The Intelligence Community Directive—900 (ICD 900) is 
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an ODNI directive issued in May 2013 that outlines integrated mission management. ICD 
900 receives its authority from the following regulations: NSA 47, IRTPA, and EO 
12333.215 ICD 900 introduces the role of the national intelligence managers (NIMs), who 
provide the DNI with advice regarding strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to a 
NIM’s portfolio, such as a region of the world, or a topic or function.216 For example, the 
National Counterterrorism Center is a functional NIM, whereas the National Intelligence 
Manager—Aviation (NIM-A) is a topical NIM.217 The NIM-A is responsible for all 
intelligence related to aviation, to include the aviation ecosystem, as introduced in Chapter 
I. The TSA should seek out the NIM-A’s support to receive guidance and direction to 
expand its role. 
ICD 900 also provides guidance the NIMs should follow to attain agreement 
seamlessly on their efforts and impacts regarding intelligence missions. The guidelines 
within ICD 900 stipulate managing the integration of cross-domain intelligence to achieve 
unity among the NIM’s areas or topics of operations, the alignment of intelligence 
disciplines, as well as integrating the production, processes, and activities of 
intelligence.218 In this connection, the TSA is mandated through the ATSA to “receive, 
assess, and distribute” all relevant intelligence related to transportation security by 
recognizing the relationship between the TSA’s intelligence division and the NIM-A’s 
responsibility to integrate all intelligence activities in the domain. A joint decision by the 
DNI and NIM-A would result in support from members of the IC to take advantage of the 
TSA’s ability to garner more transportation intelligence responding to national 
requirements.219  
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For example, the FBI notifies the TSA that an individual, previously unknown to 
have domestic extremism links, will be boarding a domestic flight in the next few hours. 
The FBI is requesting support from the TSA FAMS to collect a biological sample, such as 
DNA, while on the plane with the subject.220 In this scenario, the DNI and NIM-A agreed 
to enhance the TSA’s intelligence footprint, with the TSA FAMS having been provided 
with specialized training, funded through the NIP, to collect and report on such operational 
instances. The FAMS collects the sample, passes it off to the FBI for processing, and then 
submits an IIR for IC dissemination. The inclusion of the IIR into IC holdings pieces 
together biographical and assessment data on the subject, and identifies associates of the 
subject, and some of the subject’s associates working within the credentialed transportation 
sector.  
Ultimately, then, just like NSA 47 and EO 12333, ICD 900 is provided for the IC’s 
guidance, but also to any U.S. government entity the President of the United States, or the 
DNI in coordination with an agency or department head, such as the TSA Administrator, 
sees fit to provide such a designation.221 The TSA, as noted in the example, would then be 
able to participate legally in activities previously not considered a function of TSA 
intelligence personnel, but also in situations in which the TSA would have a more natural 
approach to provide greater benefits to the safety of the United States.  
D. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE—204 
It is not enough for the TSA to know it can legally increase its contribution to the 
IC, or that it will need the support of, in addition to the DNI and the TSA Administrator, 
the NIM-A. The TSA’s participation in additional intelligence activities can be bolstered 
through the development of transportation intelligence requirements, which will 
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distinguish the TSA from the rest of the DHS IE and align itself with the standards of the 
IC. The Intelligence Community Directive—204 (ICD 204) is an ODNI directive re-issued 
in January 2021, which outlines the NIPF.222 ICD 204 receives its authority from the 
following regulations: NSA 47, IRTPA, EO 12333, and the National Security Presidential 
Directive-26, Intelligence Priorities.223 ICD 204 is not a directive that provides legal 
authority for the TSA to engage in intelligence activities, but a directive that provides the 
structure in which the nation’s intelligence priorities are ordered, how the priorities can be 
interpreted for action, and the assessment of how the IC responds to the priorities.224  
Further, ICD 204 defines the NIM-A’s role to advise the DNI on the creation of 
national intelligence priorities, to include intelligence needs and intelligence gaps, as well 
as ad-hoc priorities for emergent intelligence needs.225 These priorities are specific to the 
NIM-A’s area of operation. For example, the TSA Administrator may possibly recognize 
a gap in the intelligence that either the DHS or IC is not collecting regarding the aviation 
ecosystem and then determine that collection needs to occur. The TSA Administrator can 
provide the intelligence priorities to the NIM-A, who in turn, advises the DNI on these 
intelligence gaps. Additionally, just as the legislations and directive noted earlier, ICD 204 
is also applicable to non-IC U.S. government entities, when designated by the President of 
the United States, or the DNI in coordination with an agency or department head. The TSA 
can then use ICD 204 as a roadmap to implement intelligence priorities specific to the 
TSA’s mission.226 
For the TSA, as an intelligence element within the DHS I&A, intelligence priorities 
are a necessity to direct TSA resources pertaining to intelligence collection. Intelligence 
priorities serve as a guidepost to show the TSA where it has collected intelligence, where 
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the intelligence gaps exist, and where the TSA needs to focus its collection efforts. Chapter 
III revealed that the DHS I&A released a Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year 2011–2018 that 
included the HSIPF, ostensibly to guide the DHS I&A intelligence collection efforts. 
However, a June 2014 GAO report found that while the DHS maintained an intelligence 
framework, the framework came up short by not setting strategic level intelligence 
priorities for the department.227 Additionally, the 2020 UDHSIC Act came up short by not 
introducing intelligence priorities. Between the 2011 Strategic Plan and the UDHSIC Act, 
it appears the DHS has not implemented an intelligence priority framework either at the 
department level or for the DHS CIP units. If the DHS has implemented a framework, the 
research does not show it being directed, or even marketed to the DHS IE. Not 
incorporating such measures, especially after 19 years, separates DHS intelligence from 
the rest of the IC. 
In discussing the distinction between the national intelligence community and the 
homeland IE in 2016, Todd Rosenblum, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (2013–2015), noted the work of the 
DHS IE amounts to “investigative data supporting tactical operations, not the strategic, 
predictive work that is the bread and butter of the IC.”228 In discussing the limits and 
capabilities of the homeland IE, Mr. Rosenblum believes the DHS IE needs to develop 
“intelligence tradecraft, the dissemination of finished intelligence and broader 
collaboration.”229 
The lack of an enterprise-wide framework to guide intelligence collection puts the 
TSA at a disadvantage. Notwithstanding, the research identified Ms. Stacey Fitzmaurice, 
while serving as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the TSA’s Intelligence & Analysis 
(I&A) office (2015–2016), was charged, among other initiatives, to create the first 
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intelligence priorities for the TSA I&A office.230 However, these requirements appear to 
be localized to the office level and potentially focused on the TSA’s tactical or transactional 
mission set.231 The effort made by Ms. Fitzmaurice showed that the TSA, at least at the 
office level, recognized the importance of establishing intelligence priorities. 
Both CBP and ICE, for example, have made efforts to become statutory IC 
members in essence to have more authoritative input into shaping the NIPF.232 However, 
the TSA, in coordination with the NIM-A, could achieve similar results as sought by CBP 
and ICE with existing legislation and directives. ICD 204 provides a path for the TSA, in 
coordination with the NIM-A’s input into the NIPF, the ability to gain more influence in 
setting national security priorities, specifically as they relate to transportation intelligence.  
Overall, the TSA could position itself much like the Armed Forces Service IC 
components, by primarily responding to requirements that answer the needs of the TSA, 
while contributing to the larger IC body of knowledge.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the current laws and directives that could be considered to 
justify the legal authority for the U.S. government, specifically the IC, to look deeper into 
expanding the TSA’s intelligence capabilities as a non-statutory IC member.  
The research found that these authorities allowed the TSA to participate in 
additional intelligence activities usually associated with statutory IC members. By way of 
the NIM-A, the TSA could begin to establish national intelligence priorities that not only 
answered intelligence gaps in the U.S. transportation sector but also supported the larger 
IC requirements. In this manner, the TSA will augment the IC’s readiness to meet the White 
House’s requirement to protect the aviation ecosystem through an all-inclusive and 
compatible approach beyond FTOs and impede the domestic terrorist, insider threat, TOCs, 
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and foreign intelligence activity.233 Any effort to do so cannot solely occur internal to the 
agency, as within a vacuum. All efforts to leverage the TSA’s capabilities and global reach 
must be developed with the cooperation of multiple departments and agencies, and use the 
current laws, acts, and directives available. 
The next chapter provides findings and recommendations to enhance the TSA’s 
support to intelligence, with consideration for how the IC can support and leverage the 
TSA’s IC capabilities. Finally, Chapter V presents a conclusion and proposes future 
research. 
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V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis described how the U.S. IC could more effectively leverage the TSA’s 
position and access to valuable information to improve the security of the United States. 
To this end, it first broke down the current threats facing America 20 years after the AQ 
attacks on 9/11, followed by TSA’s operational activities, and its current role supporting 
U.S. national intelligence. This thesis then explored the legislation to justify increasing the 
TSA’s contribution to national intelligence. This chapter first provides the findings of this 
research, followed by recommendations for decision makers to consider should they wish 
to develop the TSA’s continued support to national security further, and addresses potential 
sources of funding to support the recommendations. The chapter ends with a future 
research recommendation and a conclusion.  
A. FINDINGS  
This thesis found that FTOs were no longer the most significant threat to U.S. 
national security, and that the United States was facing a wide range of threats from 
domestic terrorists, transnational organized criminals, and espionage from both overseas 
actors and those in the homeland.234 Additionally, this thesis found in Chapter III that the 
TSA must continually evolve to respond to the emerging threats on the aviation ecosystem 
and the entire U.S. transportation sector.  
Further, this thesis found that the TSA was already providing occasional valuable 
intelligence to the IC and LE communities. The TSA nevertheless can provide more value 
to the IC through advanced intelligence collection, dissemination of raw intelligence, as 
well as preparing strategic analytic products. Finally, this thesis found that existing 
legislation would allow the TSA to participate legally in additional intelligence gathering 
activities in support of the U.S. IC.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE TSA’S SUPPORT TO 
INTELLIGENCE 
In line with these findings, this thesis proposes the following recommendations: 
develop specific transportation intelligence requirements, establish a collection 
management program, modernize the TSA’s intelligence functions, and establish a TSA 
overt strategic debriefing program.  
1. Develop Specific Transportation Intelligence Requirements  
The first recommendation is for the IC to develop specific transportation 
intelligence requirements. As explained in Chapter IV, the TSA could participate in 
additional intelligence activities by developing transportation intelligence requirements 
unique to the TSA and aligned with IC standards, specifically the NIPF.235 Further, 
Chapter IV pointed out that the DHS had not yet implemented an intelligence priority 
framework that the members of the DHS CIPs could follow. With the creation and 
inclusion of transportation intelligence requirements, the TSA would have a definitive 
roadmap for intelligence activities.236  
The TSA should involve itself, in coordination with the NIM-A, in the development 
of requirements for the NIPF based on the TSA’s extensive knowledge and experience in 
the transportation sector. Additionally, the TSA should actively provide the NIM-A with 
intelligence gaps not being collected from the IC. An example in Chapter IV illustrates the 
TSA Administrator’s need for intelligence on the aviation ecosystem when collection has 
not occurred. The TSA’s involvement with forming national priorities will elevate the 
value of transportation intelligence requirements for both the TSA and other IC members. 
As the national priorities are a formal communication of the President’s priorities regarding 
national security, agencies external to the TSA will regard transportation intelligence 
requirements as valid and attempt to collect against such requirements.  
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For the TSA to outline intelligence priorities, which will guide its collection efforts, 
it will need to review the threats from Chapter I. The TSA management will then need to 
analyze its current organizational structure and capabilities against those threats in Chapter 
III to align the appropriate operational resources. The TSA should consider how the threats 
from Chapter I can be more effectively mitigated in the operational spaces the TSA 
occupies, to include the airports, airplanes, cargo facilities, and all surface transportation.  
The national intelligence priorities are ranked from high to low. Multiple U.S. 
government agencies are already collecting on the emerging threats and focusing on the 
higher-level hard targets that receive constant attention from policy makers. The TSA 
should not shy away from these collection efforts but should develop its priorities on these 
types of targets with a niche focus. This focus could include TOC activity using American 
transportation networks overseas, or individuals who align with domestic terrorist 
organizations, specifically individuals who maintain TSA credentials to work in the 
transportation sector. According to Chapter III, while no legislation currently addresses the 
domestic terrorism threat, the TSA remains responsible for the protection of the 
transportation sector. In this way, the TSA should not be collecting on another agency’s 
area of expertise. The TSA’s intelligence collection should supplement said agency’s 
national security efforts. 
Just as the IC has continued to shift away from counterterrorism collection and 
analysis as the main national priority requirement, the TSA should take an all-inclusive 
approach to its long-term intelligence contributions by establishing national transportation 
intelligence requirements to be listed in the NIPF. Further, the TSA will need to introduce 
the national intelligence cycle to the workforce through training and education modeled on 
existing intelligence coursework from external agencies. In doing so, the TSA will be able 
to respond to threats that have an impact on the U.S. transportation sector and will lead the 
TSA to optimize its resources and evolve the organization in support of U.S. national 
security. 
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2. Establish a Collection Management Program 
The second recommendation is to establish a collection management program at 
the TSA. Tackling the threats to the U.S. transportation sector will require the talent and 
perspectives from within multiple TSA offices. Integrating the expertise of the TSA offices 
into a cross-functional intelligence program would require a robust management of 
knowledge and available resources and assets.237 In Chapter III, this thesis identified that 
the TSA already maintained access to the resources and assets required for a successful 
collection management program, to include information technology (such as WebEOC) 
and personnel. These resources and assets however are dispersed within the agency.  
Therefore, the TSA will want to localize the collection management role within the 
cross-functional program. The role of a Collection Management Officer (CMO) is the focal 
point between the TSA and the U.S. policy makers. CMOs are responsible for driving the 
collection of intelligence and evaluating the intelligence the TSA collects to ensure the 
appropriate decision makers have well-timed, precise, and succinct reporting. To illustrate, 
the TSA CMO will engage with senior policy makers to understand the tactical and 
strategic needs. The TSA CMO will also direct the collection activities of the FIOs, FAMs, 
and TSARs and guide each to stay on track with current intelligence collection and 
reporting requirements. To this end, collection management will allow for quickly 
accessing valuable information and can “provide invaluable insight into how each 
component of an intelligence operation is functioning or performing.”238 Through a robust 
collection management program, the TSA should be able to determine its most valuable 
collection sources and identify gaps for collection needs, which further adds to the 
continual development and refinement of TSA intelligence priorities.  
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If it does not already have an established collection management program, the TSA 
should consider establishing one in line with the IC as a foundation before making any 
future enhancements to its intelligence collection. This alignment may not necessarily 
function or be as robust as other collection management programs in the IC since the TSA’s 
mission set and authorities are not the same. According to a recent CIA CMO job 
description, a collection manager should have a “combination of formal training and 
independent learning,” and have “subject matter expertise,” which includes a focus on 
“region-specific issues and/or transnational issues such as counterterrorism,” as well as on 
insider threat issues.239 Therefore, the TSA will want to consider these experiences when 
filling the collection management roles. The TSA also needs to consider individuals with 
a strong background in the U.S. transportation sector, such as an intelligence analyst or an 
experienced FAMS officer with knowledge of working intelligence operations. These 
individuals must be able to think critically, to communicate effectively verbally and in 
writing, and understand the TSA’s intelligence requirements. 
Collection management is used to interpret intelligence requirements into tactical 
or strategic operational objectives and directs those collecting information and analyzing 
the collected information.240 For the TSA to have a functioning collection management 
program to allow it to identify areas in which it can support national security, it will need 
to not only receive, but also provide input into the national strategy when this input relates 
to the U.S. transportation sector. This strategy is the baseline for intelligence requirements 
that “reflect consideration of the value of intelligence activities.”241  
3. Modernize the TSA’s Intelligence Functions  
The third recommendation is to modernize the TSA’s intelligence functions. No 
organization can function at the highest level or provide a superior product if it is not 
continually improved. In 2015, the CIA made significant changes to its approach by adding 
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a new directorate, as well as establishing 10 new mission centers to be “fully optimized to 
meet current and future challenges.”242 While the CIA has an extensive mission set and 
has had more time to refine its organizational structure than the TSA, correlations exist 
between the two agencies. If mimicked on a smaller scale, the TSA can improve its 
intelligence processes, which will eventually lead to more intelligence gains since it relates 
to protecting the U.S. transportation sector. Optimizing the TSA would include 
streamlining the expertise of multiple offices and divisions into cross-functional teams, 
such as the CIA’s mission centers.  
According to Chapter IV, the TSA should consider streamlining its intelligence 
functions by setting up cross-functional teams from each division that would include 
expertise in intelligence, law enforcement, tactical (transactional) and strategic objectives, 
human capital, technical, and analytic support, and align the teams according to the TSA’s 
intelligence priorities framework. For example, cross-functional teams could be structured 
by topic or region. Teams could then be focused on aviation in one regional area, or teams 
focused on all transportation nodes in a regional area. By modernizing the organization 
with cross-functional teams, the TSA could gain a better understanding of its intelligence 
value, through the input of staff members who maintain diverse viewpoints and 
experiences. This organizational and systematic change could allow the TSA to be more 
effectively in line to address the Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration 
Plan. That plan recognizes the “threats in the [Aviation Ecosystem] are continually 
evolving and require constant monitoring and adjustments in methods for collecting, 
analyzing…intelligence, and other information.”243 Further, a diverse team focusing on 
the TSA’s intelligence functions could be able to engage in current operations and identify 
potential gaps. For example, which intelligence priorities requiring the most attention could 
be filled with a previously discussed collection management program? 
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Chapter III laid out the structure of the TSA’s I&A office, which included its field 
mission through its FIOs, multiple 24/7 watch floors, and the EAB within the TSA’s 
NTVC.244 All these units play a role in intelligence collection to contribute to improved 
IC analysis of potential threats to U.S. national security. However, implementing these 
previously discussed cross-functional teams could allow the TSA to incorporate the 
expertise of units outside I&A. These units include the Law Enforcement/Federal Air 
Marshal Service, Security Operations, and Enterprise Support, among others.245 In 
Chapter IV, the DHS intelligence products were described as “investigative data supporting 
tactical operations,” which had been limiting the DHS’s intelligence contributions.246 
Therefore, to not restrict the capabilities of the TSA, the TSA should develop a plan to 
leverage the experience and expertise of its offices to optimize its intelligence collection to 
support strategic objectives.247  
4. Establish a TSA Overt Strategic Debriefing Program  
The fourth recommendation is to develop a TSA overt strategic debriefing program. 
Indeed, after successfully implementing the three previous recommendations, the TSA, 
using its existing organizational assets described in Chapter III, could increase its 
intelligence functions to respond to the threats from Chapter I to support national 
intelligence. To this end, the TSA should consider establishing an overt strategic debriefing 
program that takes advantage of both its domestic and international presence. Such a 
program would be responsible for developing and executing overt HUMINT collection 
operations to include intelligence debriefings of overt sources, drafting raw intelligence 
reports, responding to customer requests for intelligence and collection management 
requirements, as well as maintaining detailed operational records.  
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The TSA already has an existing structure for this type of intelligence activity with 
the current placement of the FIOs and FAMS from Chapter III, as well as with the TSA’s 
internationally placed TSARs who work out of U.S. embassies. The TSA currently engages 
in potentially reportable interactions with foreign partners, through foreign airport 
assessments and carrier inspections, as well as the TSA’s audits of foreign repair 
stations.248 Both the FIO’s and the TSAR’s baseline positions should be about forming 
relationships with individuals and organizations with ties to the transportation sector.249 
Both these positions lend themselves for consideration of an overt debriefing program that 
may answer priority NIPF transportation requirements. These requirements should be 
reported in a standard intelligence format, such as the IIR. The TSA overt strategic 
debriefer would not be recruiting sources, such as a CIA operations officer, but would 
interview TSA and DHS staff who had collected information in the course of their official 
U.S. government duties.250  
The TSA and DHS encompass thousands of employees who travel and engage with 
targets of interest to the IC. Some of these interactions will answer NIPF requirements and 
can be documented by the FIOs, FAMS, or TSARs for dissemination to the IC for analysis. 
As discussed in Chapter III, any information shared with the IC would mask the name of 
the USPER providing the information. To address the TSA’s large footprint, the TSA will 
want to consider how the debriefers are situated within its organization. The TSA 
debriefers could be headquarters based and deployed to certain domestic or international 
locations for a specified period, or the debriefers could receive a permanent change of 
station to a location away from headquarters.  
Further, the TSA FIOs could be deployed in both domestic and foreign airports, 
preferably in countries that did not have a TSAR to engage with individuals with positions 
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and access to answer transportation priority requirements. The FIOs and TSARs would 
debrief foreign nationals within the transportation sector able to respond to the priority 
requirements. The FIOs and TSARs would also debrief DHS employees who had traveled 
overseas representing the U.S. government, and interacted with foreign nationals, foreign 
organizations, or foreign facilities who might be able to respond to the intelligence 
requirements.251 The initial reaction to such a proposal may seem far-fetched and be met 
with resistance, such as the public’s fear of government overreach, or the presses’ and 
Congresses’ beliefs from Chapter II that the TSA should be privatized. However, such 
hesitation can be abated by recognizing that strategic debriefing only engages with people 
willing to answer intelligence requirements. Such meetings with voluntary participants 
must be non-aggressive and professional in nature.252 As noted in Chapter IV, the TSA 
would not be allowed to engage in clandestine activity since all collection activity would 
be overt in nature. 
The situation becomes much more difficult when considering strategic debriefing, 
which the IC may attribute to HUMINT. Areas to consider are the recruitment of HUMINT 
collectors to the TSA, if the TSA does not want to use the FIOs in place, or simply needs 
to add more collectors to meet demand. Additionally, the TSA must consider how the 
debriefers will be trained. While this thesis does propose the current FIOs can conduct the 
debriefing mission, TSA’s human capital (HC) will recognize that new recruits without 
training will always be in the pipeline. Therefore, the TSA will want to determine if it 
wants to train debriefers from its standards, or if it will choose to use an existing training 
course that may be provided by one or more IC members.  
Chapter IV briefly discussed these training questions that the TSA would face, in 
the example of the FBI seeking the assistance of the FAMS in the collection of valuable 
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information, such as human DNA.253 With the support of the external IC agencies and 
their funding mechanisms, specifically the NIP, the TSA should consider using the existing 
training systems in place for both new collector training, as well as identifying existing 
personnel with collection training and experience; no need to reinvent the wheel. Also, 
given the high-paced HUMINT collection efforts over the last 20 years, in various 
operating environments, it would seem probable that many viable candidates could fill the 
TSA collection pipeline for years to come and ease potential concerns for the TSA HC and 
the TSA’s senior leadership. 
Finally, and while not necessarily an immediate debate, will the TSA want to 
consider whether its debriefers are allowed to work in a joint-duty assignment with another 
IC organization, ostensibly to conduct activity in a debriefer capacity? Given that the TSA 
overt strategic debriefer position will be a new career path for the agency, those who want 
to compete for such positions will be interested to know what type of professional growth 
they may experience. Allowing the TSA debriefers the ability to conduct a join-duty 
assignment will be at the discretion of the TSA senior leadership and the TSA HC. 
Allowing a TSA debriefer however the capability to experience the operational activity of 
an external agency can prove valuable. First, the TSA debriefer will potentially gain 
experience with an organization that has been conducting overt HUMINT activity for 
decades, and in all types of operational environments. This type of experience will be of 
value to both newly trained debriefers, and seasoned debriefers alike. Most importantly, 
the returning joint-duty TSA debriefers will return to the TSA with a wealth of knowledge 
and should have the proficiency to pass along their experience to the TSA to grow and 
mature its newly functioning intelligence capability.  
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example, a plastic soda bottle left at a public dining table may be collected legally if the person associated 
with that bottle has clearly left the item behind. The collection of the hDNA is acceptable if it is not 
collected under coercion. Many articles, journals, and legal rulings discuss the collection of hDNA, and 
collection efforts to obtain a person’s DNA should not be considered a nefarious act. The collection of 
abandoned hDNA may be surprising to the general public. The general public’s knowledge of the possible 
hDNA collection by the TSA would need to be addressed in the paradigm of continued security to the 
transportation sector.  
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5. Funding the Implementation of the Recommendations 
Overall, reporting on information of intelligence value, through overt strategic 
debriefing, is a prudent measure considering the shifting focus of national priorities.254 
While HC and budget restraints are a reality for most U.S. government organizations, the 
TSA does not have to start from scratch. The TSA can begin with the training and 
experience of existing intelligence programs, and potentially access funds from the NIP 
budget from Chapter IV.255 Not only is the NIP budget flexible to move programmed 
money into different operational requirements, but the NIP funding can be used by non-
statutory IC elements of the U.S. government from Chapter IV.256 This type of effort will 
allow the TSA to optimize itself in today’s current threat environment and provide 
enhanced support to U.S. national security. 
C. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This thesis proposes consideration should be given to leverage further the collection 
of systems, policies, and procedures of the DHS to counter today’s threats more fully. 
While multiple components of the DHS contribute to the U.S. intelligence cycle, this thesis 
focuses on the value of the TSA’s contributions to lay the groundwork to illustrate the 
TSA’s advantageous position to collect and report on priority intelligence requirements.257  
Research revealed that the TSA was uniquely situated to capitalize on the 
organization’s existing structure for additional intelligence gains. With some adjustments 
to processes, personnel, and policy considerations, the TSA could grow from its initial 
directive of aviation security to its full legal design, as stated by the U.S. Congress to 
“develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats,” and “make other plans 
 
254 Swan, “DHS Looking at Tracking Travel of Domestic Extremists.” 
255 “HUMINT,” Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed December 17, 2020, 
https://www.dia.mil/Careers-Internships/Career-Fields/Human-Intelligence/#overview. 
256 The NIP is divided into three programs: civilian, defense, and community wide. Included within 
the NIP’s civilian program is the DHS Program, in which the DNI can transfer or reprogram “5 percent of 
any NIP funds for an agency.” Lowenthal, Intelligence. 
257 Department of Homeland Security, “The Intelligence Enterprise,” 11–12, 20. 
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related to transportation security, including coordinating countermeasures” in support of 
U.S. national security.258  
As noted in Chapter III, the intelligence being produced within the DHS had been 
compared to spam. With the implementation of the thesis recommendations, the DHS, and 
more specifically, the TSA’s intelligence, can move to the proverbial “Inbox.” 
The next research focus could be the cost-benefit analysis to implement the thesis’ 
recommendations. Future research could be useful in determining the economical pros and 
cons of the thesis proposal and identify any alternate budgetary proposal that might need 
to be considered. 
  
 
258 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, 2.  
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